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ABSTRACT
The Forgotten Signature: An Observational Study on Policy of Securing Identity in Prevention
of Identity Theft and Credit/Debit Card Fraud at Retail Stores ’POS Terminals
by
Belinda R. Wilson
Identity theft and credit and bank card fraud is increasing in America and worldwide. Given the
current statistics of its prevalence and practices around the world, many in government are
starting to take critical notice due to its impact on a nation’s economy. Limited amounts of
research have been conducted regarding the practices of applying the Routine Activities Theory
(Cohen & Felson, 1979) to better equip store managers in understanding the critical need for
capable and effective point of sale guardianship for in-store prevention of credit or bank card
fraud due to identity theft. This research has used qualitative observational studies to investigate
the presence of or lack of capable guardianship at point of sales transactions in large department
stores where a majority of in-store credit and bank card fraud loss occurs. Findings conclude an
overwhelming lack of capable guardianship at retail store POS terminals.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Identity theft and bank card fraud has been on the rise in America and worldwide. According
to the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, there were 17.6 million
U.S. residents who reported experiencing identity theft in 2014 alone (Harrell, 2015).
Surprisingly, two-thirds of these suffered direct financial loss of $99 or less that involved
fraudulent plastic card purchases. Accumulatively, “direct and indirect losses from identity theft
totaled $24.7 billion in 2012” (Harrell, 2013). Considering the crime is a white collar financial
crime, it is relatively difficult to assess and most difficult to research and analyze. Given the
current statistics of its prevalence and practices around the world, many in government are
starting to take critical notice due to its impact on a nation’s economy. Some researchers have
attempted to understand this phenomena by applying certain criminological theories to their
research (Hollis, Felson, & Welsh, 2013; Tillyer & Eck, 2011; White & Fisher, 2008). However,
extremely limited amounts of research have been conducted regarding the practices of applying
the Routine Activities Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) to better equip store managers in
understanding the critical need for capable and effective point of sale guardianship for in-store
prevention of credit or bank card fraud due to identity theft (Masuda, 1992; Sampson, Eck, &
Dunham, 2008; Vaughan, 1998). This research has explored the absence or presence of capable
guardianship at point of sales in large department stores where a majority of in-store identity
theft and plastic card fraud loss occurs.
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Statement and Significance of the Problem
According to a U.S. Department of Justice report explaining criminal fraud, in 1998,
Congress created a new federal offense called “identity theft.” This new federal offense was a
result of an infamous case of identity theft where a convicted felon had incurred more than
$100,000 of credit card debt in the name of is victim. The identity thieve purchased homes,
handguns, motorcycles and other costly items before filing for bankruptcy—also in his victim’s
name (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 2015). Since that first label identifying ‘identity theft,’ a more
recent publication, Victims of Identity Theft, 2012 Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that “the
majority of identity theft incidents (85%) involved the fraudulent use of existing account
information, such as credit and debit card or bank account information” (Harrell & Langton,
2013). According to this same report, “direct and indirect losses from identity theft totaled $24.7
billion in 2012,” in the U.S. alone (Harrell & Langton, 2013). Identity theft and credit or debit
forms of plastic card fraud accounted for over 800 million English pounds worth in fraud loss
worldwide several years ago.

This figure translated to be approximately $1550 million in US

currency at previous exchange rates (Gee et al., 2010 as cited in Papadopoulos and Brooks,
2011). It was reported by other researchers that more than 27 million Americans were victims of
identity theft and fraud just within five previous years combined (Gerard, Hillison, & Pacini,
2004 as cited in White & Fisher, 2008). The numbers have escalated since. In 2014 alone, an
“estimated 17.6 million persons, or 7% of all U.S. residents age 16 or older, were victims of one
or more incidents of identity theft,” up from the 16.6 million persons reported in 2012 (Harrell,
2015). It was also reported that “in 2014, the most common type of identity theft was the
unauthorized misuse or attempted misuse of an existing account and that of those about 79% of
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victims experienced a single incident of identity theft, while 21% experienced multiple
incidents” (Harrell, 2015).
Financial identity theft and fraud occurs when identity thieves use a victim’s personal
identifying information to conduct fraudulent financial practices that include drawing money
from a victim’s bank account, opening up a new bank account or other line of credit in the
victim’s name, or stealing the victim’s personal identifying information for specific purposes of
creating fake credit cards using the name of the victim—all the while he or she still holds the
card in hand (White & Fisher, 2008). Identity theft and credit card fraud can occur online or instore and without the victim’s awareness, until after the loss has incurred and their account has
been damaged. When this happens, the victim has the primary responsibility of discovering it
and reporting to their bank institution or credit card company. They in turn attempt to refund the
loss, while re-distributing the costs of the loss onto the customers. There is a critical window of
opportunity for the victim to report the loss in order to minimize it—the first 48-72 hours that his
or her card is being fraudulently charged. If a customer gets notice 30 days later when the bill
arrives in the mail, it may be too late to stop the account from having been drained or the credit
card from having been completely maxed out.
Both in-store and online identity theft and credit fraud is on the increase. Most research
has been done on the themes of absence of capable guardianship and the victimization of suitable
online targets using the routine activities theory (Bossler & Holt, 2009; Choo, 2011; Holtfreter,
Reisig, & Pratt, 2008; Kleemans, Soudijn, & Weenink, 2012; Pratt, Holtfreter, & Reisig, 2010;
Reyns, 2010). One study used integrated theory of Routine Activities Theory (Cohen &
Felson,1979) and Lifestyle Exposure Theory (Hindelang, Gottfredson, & Garofalo, 1978) to
conduct an empirical assessment of 204 college students in hopes to gain an overall picture of the
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relationship between the causal factors and online victimization (Choi, 2008). According to
Choi online computer crimes such as these are rarely detected by the victims or reported to the
police (Choi, 2008, p. 308). Accounts can be hacked into without the victim’s knowledge until it
is too late. “Hacking” refers to the unauthorized access with intent to cause damage, steal
property (databases containing customers’ account information) and leaving behind some
evidence of a successful break-in (National White-Collar Crime Center 2003, p.1 as cited in
Choi, 2008). White collar crimes are particularly hard to research and prosecute because it is
difficult to discover the faceless motivated offenders. So the need for adequate guardianship is
primary to avoid the attack and the fraud loss incurred. According to Choi, the crucial key
purpose of capable guardianship online as well as in real life is to prevent crime (Choi, 2008).
The results from his empirical assessment demonstrated that the online lifestyle and digital
guardianship are important aspects of computer crime victimization (Choi, 2008, p. 325).
Other research studies analyze online statistical fraud detection systems and have been conducted
around the world in countries such as Australia, Turkey, Korea, and America (Bolton & Hand,
2002; Choo, 2011; Duman & Ozcelik, 2011; Lee, Cho, Chae, & Shim, 2009). The problem is
that the statistical detection systems are only useful after the identity theft and plastic card fraud
has already occurred and damages have incurred. By this time, money has been lost and crime
has prevailed. There is currently nothing available in research demonstrating technology that is
capable of acting as a completely reliable and adequate guardian to prevent online or in-store
identity theft and fraud loss. The software available is only capable of detecting the fraud once it
has happened—and that only part of the time. This lack of adequate technological guardianship
has given cause for the rise of more sophisticated security measures being placed upon the
plastic card payment form itself. Hence, the EMV chip technology, or European Model Visa

14

card security measures have recently been implemented into the United States. As of October 1,
2015 the EMV liability shift has changed the face of how merchants are doing business in their
daily routine activities of accepting Visa and MasterCard plastic card payments. Visa and
MasterCard were amongst the first of all credit card companies to make the transition of
encrypting EMV chip technology into their cards produced for customers residing within the
United States. Along with this new technology, comes the accountability of merchants for
accepting fraudulent card payments. The merchants and their employees are now being held
liable and responsible for all chargebacks and fraud loss, rather than the credit card companies
themselves. This new EMV liability shift has required a transition from old equipment at instore POS terminals to be replaced by new equipment that has capabilities of reading the EMV
chip encrypted into the new cards. Due to a backlog of reader approvals and certifications, as
well as the costly transfer of equipment, many merchants are still in the process of making the
mandated transition. Meanwhile, magnetic stripes are still located on the backs of each of the
cards that are containing the new encrypted EMV chip technology and those strips still contain
all of the account holders’ personal identifying information and can still be skimmed by devices
that read magnetic strips. Many merchants are still using the swipe method of reading the
magnetic strips to process the transactions at the in-store POS terminals while awaiting
certification of their new equipment. This leads to this thesis paper’s initial research question of
current absence or presence of capable guardianship being demonstrated by merchants and their
employees at their in-store POS terminals.
Only limited research has currently been done on the absence of capable guardianship
regarding in-store purchases (Hollis et al., 2013; Sampson et al., 2010; Tillyer & Eck, 2011).
Some have applied routine activities theory in attempts to understand how to get a handle on
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crimes involving fraud. Others have tried to analyze trends to build a defense (Prabowo, 2011).
One particular study attempts to analyze the prevalence, clearance rates, and victim/offender
characteristics (Allison, Schuck, & Lersch, 2005). Very limited research has been done on actual
identity theft and credit card fraud prevention itself (Anderson, Durbin, & Salinger, 2008;
Barker, D’Amato, & Sheridon, 2008). A few other studies conducted are relative to the topic of
handlers and managers and raising their guardianship capabilities and accountabilities (Masuda,
1992; Sampson et al., 2010; Vaughan, 1998). However, the only current study done within the
past decade is that of Sampson et al., (2010) applying routine activity theory to explain crime
prevention success or failure. This study is an important study to the to the topic of why and
how in-store point of sales transactions are critical junctures of catching identity thieves and
credit card fraudsters by holding the managers liable as “super controllers for crime prevention”
(Sampson et al., 2010). A final relevant study to the topic of in-store identity theft and credit
card fraud can be found in an article published by Journal of Business Research, entitled
“Repercussions of promoting an ideology of consumption: Consumer misbehavior” (Fullerton &
Punj, 2004). This article describes consumer misbehaviors coming in many forms such as
shoplifting, vandalism, credit card fraud, and physical or verbal abuse of other consumers and of
marketer employees (Fullerton & Punj, 2004). Due to these consumer misbehaviors, it is
suspected that many businesses would prefer to chalk fraud loss up to the costs of doing business
rather than jeopardize employees’ safety or allow credit card fraudsters to create an atmosphere
of disharmony within the store and frighten other customers causing the store to lose their
business.
Policy making and policing of identity theft and credit and bank card fraud present
additional challenges. According to research, 40% of it goes unreported to police authorities
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(Papadopoulos & Brooks, 2011; White & Fisher, 2008). There is a call for new public
management for policing of fraud (Doig, Johnson, & Levi, 2001). There is also a need for
offender-based research to inform policy on adequate guardianship prevention methods (Copes
& Vieraitis, 2009; Copes, Veiratis, & Jochum, 2007). As previously discussed, new changes in
policy have been made by Visa and MasterCard regarding the EMV liability shift that took place
beginning October 1, 2015. But those policy changes in credit card companies alone, even with
the new EMV chip card encryptions, are questionably inadequate in handling the job of policing
this crime or preventing it, which became inherently evident during the field research and
observational studies accumulated for this thesis.
Based upon the review of the most available material on this topic of research, it is
apparent there is a need for redefining capable guardianship. As demonstrated through various
applications to the many elements surrounding identity theft and plastic card fraud, it is
warranted that routine activities theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson, 2008; Felson & Clarke,
1998) is the most applicable criminology theory for explaining this phenomenon. The absence
of capable guardianship prevails over fraudulent plastic card transactions and demonstrates dire
need of research in efforts of understanding the problem and why there is such negligence. This
research is necessary as serious study for developing future policies for creating a presence of
capable guardianship in order to more effectively deter and prevent this crime. The dominant
themes throughout the body of research materials has covered various aspects relating to routine
activities theory regarding motivated offenders and suitable targets, yet it has minimally
addressed the reasoning of why there is absence of capable guardianship when customers pay
with plastic cards. This absence of capable guardianship has allowed identity theft and plastic
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card fraud crimes to continue to grow by leaps and bounds—both within the cyber world and the
real physical world.
Purpose of this Research
The purpose of this research is to investigate by first-hand field observations the absence
or presence of capable guardianship at point-of-sale (POS) terminals within retail store chains
that are known to be highly targeted for identity theft in conjunction with credit, debit or bank
card fraud. (See pages 61- 62 of this thesis). A majority of bank cards bear the logo of either
Visa or MasterCard. Both Visa and MasterCard mandate certain rules and regulations to be
followed by merchants and their employees as outlined by their merchant agreement contracts
(See Appendices C & D). Banks also have their own specific rules and regulations that are to be
adhered to in order for the merchant to accept the card bearing the Visa or MasterCard logo for
payment (See Appendix B).
Specifically, these rules require that each card must bear the legal cardholder’s genuine
signature on the back of the card within the signature strip that is located below the magnetic
strip and beside the CVV code. Either above or below each signature strip located on the back of
each card, are the words that read, “AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE – NOT VALID UNLESS
SIGNED” (See Appendix C). Point-of-sale face-to-face transactions that occur within retail
stores, with cards in hands of customers, are considered by both Visa and MasterCard to be the
least risky transactions of all because the merchant’s employees have the opportunity to
investigate the identity of the customers paying with a plastic card method, and are required to
do so if the card is not signed. The steps that the employees must follow at the POS terminal
during the transaction are outlined by Bank Rules, Visa, and MasterCard (See Appendices B, C,
& D for details). This investigator believes that the responsibility of acting as a capable guardian
18

that is placed upon the merchant and its employees is one that is often neglected and dismissed,
thus it is also a contributing factor to the increase of identity theft related to card fraud.
Research Questions Addressed and Hypotheses
Specifically, the following questions were addressed and hypothesized:
RQ1: The first research question contains five parts: 1) Will the cashier at the point of
sale transaction act as a capable guardian over the face-to-face transaction and act to help prevent
identity theft and credit/debit card fraud by taking the card into his or her hand to visually check
the back of the credit or debit card to see if it bears an authorized signature by the legal
cardholder, or check the account number on the card and compare it to that in the system or
receipt in according to the merchant agreement rules as mandated by the Bank Rules and
Regulations, Visa and MasterCard? (See Appendices B, C, & D). Variables investigated:
2) Will the variables of non-electronic versus electronic purchase increase levels of capable
guardianship? Will there be a difference in the level of capable guardianship if the purchase is
made at the back electronic counter POS terminal versus the store’s front end POS terminal? 3)
Will the higher amount of purchase charges to the card raise levels of guardianship at POS
terminals with electronic purchases compared to a low levels of guardianship for small charges
to the card? 4) Will the variables of time segment of day or night and business or lack thereof
give increase or decrease to the levels of capable guardianship? 5) Will there be a difference of
levels of guardianship based upon gender or race of the employee processing the transaction at
each POS terminal?
Ho1: There will be an overall generalized absence of capable guardianship at the POS
terminals during the face-to-face card in hand transaction, and the cashiers will not act as a
capable guardians over the card accounts in keeping with Bank Rules, Visa and MasterCard
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merchant agreement contracts in efforts to prevent identity theft. They will not take the card in
hand at any point during the transaction to specifically compare the account number listed on the
face of the card to that showing in the system nor will the cashier specifically check the back of
the card to see if it has been validated by an authorized signature. Variable Hypotheses:
2) There will be a slight to significant difference between levels of guardianship when the
purchase is an electronics purchase versus a non-electronic purchase or whether the purchase
was made at the store’s front end register or back electronic counter register. 3) There will be a
higher level of capable guardianship demonstrated by participants at POS terminals when the
charges to the credit card are over $50 versus those under $50. 4) There may be a slight
difference in higher levels of guardianship depending upon the business of the store or lack
thereof.

5) There will be no difference if the cashier is male nor female, Black or White.

Overall, there will be a generalized absence of capable guardianship at the POS terminals within
each store chain by all participants, with higher levels of guardianship being demonstrated only
by those participants processing electronics purchases.
RQ2: Will the cashier at the face-to-face transaction at the POS (point-of-sale) terminal
require the cardholder and purchaser to sign the back of the unsigned card used for purchase, and
will he or she make her show a government issued photo identification for verification of her
identity before the transaction is allowed to be processed through, in keeping with merchant
agreement rules as mandated by Bank Rules and Regulations, Visa and MasterCard?
Ho2: The cashier will not check the back of the card, and therefore, will not check for an
authorized signature validated the card. Consequently, the cashier will neither ask her to show a
government issued photo identification document bearing her genuine signature for comparison
or verifying her identity before the transaction will be allowed to be processed through to its
20

entirety. Ultimately, it is hypothesized that the cashier will not abide by the Bank Rules and
Regulations, the Visa merchant rules for accepting unsigned cards, nor the MasterCard rules for
accepting unsigned cards (See Appendices B, C, & D for references).
RQ3: Will the cashier act in lieu of an FDE (Forensic Document Examiner) to
investigate by visual comparison the general similarities or differences of handwriting
demonstrated on the government issued photo identification bearing a genuine signature of the
researcher to that of the unsigned card that should be required to be signed in the presence of the
cashier at the POS terminal?
Ho3: The cashier will not check the back of the card, and therefore, will not check for an
authorized signature validating the card; thus, he or she will neither attempt to ask the researcher
to sign the back of the card nor show government photo identification bearing her genuine
signature, nor will he or she act in lieu of an FDE to investigate by general visual comparison the
general similarities or differences of the handwriting on the government issued identification to
that of the signature on the back of the card per requested signature. The cashier will not request
a signature on the back of the card, and the only signature requested will be that prompted by the
electronic signature capturing device at POS terminal.
RQ4: Will the cashier rely solely upon the electronic capturing device to verify the
signature and not personally look at it himself or herself?
RQ5: Will the participant cashier at the POS terminal solely depend upon the EMC chip
reader technology newly implemented at the POS terminals equipped with such to “guard” over
the identity of the cardholder, even when neither a PIN number nor signature is required nor
requested for the transaction to be processed?
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Ho4 and Ho5: The cashier participant processing the transaction will demonstrate heavy
reliance upon the electronic signature capturing device, if a signature is required, and/or the
EMV chip reader technology to “guard” over the face-to-face card in hand sales transaction at
the POS terminal, whether a PIN is requested or required or not.
Limitations of the Study
This field research was limited strictly to observations made as a credit card payment
purchaser in 28 separate large department stores of three commonly targeted chains—all located
within the tri-state region of Eastern Tennessee, Western Virginia, and Northeastern North
Carolina and one in Georgia. Therefore, it lacks sufficient quantity for external validity and
large generalizability. Additionally, it does not involve guardianship issues related to online
identity theft and credit or debit card fraud that is also a major contributor of fraud. The internal
validity is weakened in that this study only portrays the observations of those representatives
sampled within this specific region. Therefore, the information gathered and coded for this
analysis is restricted to observations only and not interviews with individual managers or
employees, which may yield additional insight to findings. There is little criminological research
done on this specific area of adequate guardianship at point of sale transactions involving in store
merchant sales clerk employees or managers and their adherence to the merchant agreement
contracts as mandated by Visa, MasterCard and Bank Rules (See Appendix B, C, & D). To date,
no criminology research has been reported analyzing why large scale identity theft in credit and
debit card fraud occurs at specific large department store chains or why they are strongly
considered as suitable targets by motivated fraud offenders.
This field research study is the first of its kind and, therefore, limited to understanding the
nature and origin of the problem from a criminological theoretical perspective and observations
22

made during first hand face-to-face transactions at POS terminals within three specific retail
store chains only. Observing other retail store chains during card in hand transactions may yield
different results depending upon the other merchant’s rigidity of adherence to merchant
agreement contracts and responsibilities of verifying identity of cardholders during POS face-toface transactions. Other limitations also included are those inherently related to consumer
profiling and these are restricted in this particular study to the investigator’s personal
characteristics and demographics of a white conservative middle-class middle-aged female.
Consumers with various individual characteristics and demographics may prompt different
reactions from the employees at POS terminals during face-to-face transactions yielding different
results.
Definitions of Terms
For a clearer understanding of this thesis, the following terms are defined:
Authentication: “Authentication is the process of assuring that a credit card transaction
has been initiated by an authorized user of that card. From the merchant's point of view,
authentication means getting the right information from the consumer, and having it verified by
the transaction network. In recent years, authentication has been stepped up by means including
security codes on credit cards” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Authorization: “Authorization is an important concept for both credit cardholders and
credit card merchant accounts. Every retailer has a purchase limit above which they must seek
authorization from the card issuer before they can complete the sale. Such authorization can be
done by telephone or electronically at the cash register. Authorization is used to control credit
card fraud. Authorization is also the first step in processing a credit card. After a merchant
swipes the card, the data is submitted to merchant’s bank, called an acquirer, to request
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authorization for the sale. The acquirer then routes the request to the card-issuing bank, where it
is authorized or denied, and the merchant is allowed to process the sale”
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Authorized Transaction: “In credit card terminology, an authorized transaction is one
that has been approved” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Bank Card: A bank card is a form of a plastic payment method that is distributed by one’s
bank and allows the account holder and thus, cardholder, to make purchases using one’s card as
either debit or credit payment while deducting available funds from one’s account. All bank
cards bear either the Visa or MasterCard logo and are subject to each one’s respective rules and
regulations for honoring the card at merchants’ stores.
Capable Guardianship: Capable guardianship is one of the elements missing in the crime
triangle developed by criminologists, Felson and Cohen (1979). The absence of capable
guardianship is what contributes to crime occurrences. The presence of capable guardianship
deters crime from happening. In the aspect of this thesis, capable guardianship in the
environment of daily routine activities of shopping would require that the employees,
specifically those at the POS terminals would vigilantly guard the sales transactions, checking
for appropriate signatures and identity, in efforts to obey the rules and regulations set forth by
Visa and MasterCard in their merchant agreement policies, to help prevent identity theft and
card-present fraudulent transactions.
Cardholder: A cardholder is the person holding the card in hand in preparation of making
purchases either online, or for this research purpose, in store during face-to-face transactions at
POS terminals within each store. A cardholder has the responsibility of providing a genuine
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signature and government issued photo identification for verification at POS terminals, when and
if requested by the cashier or manager during transactions.
Card Present: “Card-present transactions are those in which a credit card is physically
present. Merchants are charged different levels of fees by the card transaction processors (such
as Visa, MasterCard), depending on the level of fraud risk. Card present transactions, because the
card is available for inspection, are considered less risky and therefore carry lower fees than
online or phone transactions” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Card Present Fraud: “Card-present fraud occurs when a credit or debit card is used to
make an unauthorized transaction in a face-to-face setting, such as a grocery store checkout lane.
This type of fraud may involve the use of the actual stolen card or a fraudulent duplicated card
made using a card number and magnetic stripe information” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Card-Present (CP) Transactions: “Credit or debit card transactions conducted face-toface, in which the card is physically swiped. Card-present transactions are considered more
secure than card-not-present transactions, since a merchant can view the buyer, the card and the
signature on it” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Chargeback: “A credit card chargeback occurs when a charge is reversed, returning
credit to a credit card customer from a merchant. There are several parties involved, since a
return transaction goes through the customer's bank, the credit card processing interchange (such
as Visa or MasterCard) and the merchant's bank. Consumers can sometimes initiate a chargeback
when they dispute a purchase made from a merchant”
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
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Chip Enabled Terminal: “Point-of-sale terminals that have or are connected to a chip
card reader, an EMV application and can process chip card transactions. ATMs can also be chipenabled. (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Chip and Pin Cards: “A type of ‘smart card,’ chip-and-PIN cards use computer chips to
store and process information instead of, or in addition to, a magnetic stripe. A personal
identification number (PIN) is required at point of sale. The technology has replaced older-style
magnetic stripes in Europe and is being adopted in much of the world. The United States has
been slow to adopt the technology, but has begun to do so, especially with credit cards intended
for international travelers” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Chip and Signature:

“Chip and signature describes a form of credit card authentication

coming into use in the United States. Traditionally, American credit cards were authorized for
use via the data on magnetic stripes on the backs of the cards. As their name implies, chip-andsignature cards have a chip embedded within them, and the authority to use them is verified by
signature. Chip-and-signature cards are an advancement in security over magnetic stripes, but not
as secure as chip-and-PIN cards, which are verified with a PIN number”
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Cloning: “Cloning is a technique criminals use to make counterfeit credit cards with
working, stolen credit card numbers. The credit card numbers are often obtained through
skimming” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Credit Card: “A credit card is a payment card that is accepted by merchants, and which
can be read at the point of sale. Credit cards offer revolving lines of credit to cardholders, which
means they have the ability to pay balances over time” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
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Credit Card Number: “A credit card number is the unique number imprinted on a credit
card. The first six digits on a credit card are called the issuer identification number. They identify
the issuer -- Discover, or American Express, for example. The remaining digits of a credit card
number are unique to the individual card. Credit card numbers are usually embossed, a remnant
the days when a physical impression of credit cards were made through zip-zap machines”
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Credit/Debit Card Fraud: Credit or debit card fraud is the act of stealing another person’s
identity for the purpose of using that person’s account to purchase items for oneself or to be
resold for profit. Credit/debit card fraud occurs when someone has used another person’s plastic
card payment method without permission and without being an authorized user on the account.
Identity theft is the primary crime occurring, while theft is the secondary.
Crime Triangle: The “crime triangle” is a theory developed by criminologists, Marcus
Felson and Lawrence Cohen, the creators of the Routine Activities Theory (1979). It
demonstrates the convergence of three essential ingredients necessary for crime to take place—
motivated offenders, suitable targets, and an absence of capable guardianship. See Figure 1
below:
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Suitable Targets
CRIME

Absence of Capable
Guardianship

Motivated Offenders
Figure 1. The “Crime Triangle” demonstrates the three necessary elements for a crime to occur:
1) Suitable Targets, 2) Motivated Offenders, 3) Absence of Capable Guardianship. This was
developed by criminologists, Cohen and Felson (1979).
CVV: “CVV is one of the credit card industry's several acronyms for the credit card
security code that helps verify the legitimacy of a credit card. Depending on the card, the security
code can be a three-digit or four-digit number, printed on either on the back of the card or the
front. CVV stands for ‘card verification value’ code. Other card issuers call their security codes
CVV2 (Visa), CVC2 (MasterCard) or CID (American Express)”
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Debit Card: “While debit cards and credit cards are alike in appearance, they differ in
one critical aspect: A debit card withdraws money from a bank account, while a credit card
creates a loan. Think of them as ‘pay now’ (debit) versus ‘pay later’ (credit). Today's debit card
users often have the choice of authorizing transactions by either PIN or signature. While that
choice often makes no difference to the consumer, it makes a great deal of difference to the
merchant and transaction processors. A PIN transaction uses one payment system, the signature
uses another, each carrying different fees” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
EMV Card: “An EMV card, also called a chip-and-PIN card or smart card, contains a
special computer chip to store card account data. Unlike magnetic-stripe cards, every time an
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EMV card is used for payment, the chip creates a unique transaction code that cannot be reused,
thus stymying counterfeit card fraud. The initials EMV stand for Europay, MasterCard and Visa
-- the three processing firms that in 2002 first agreed to the standards. EMV cards are widespread
in Europe and other parts of the world, and are being rolled out in the
U.S.”(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
EMV Chip Card Technology: “EMV® is a global standard for credit and debit payment
cards based on chip card technology taking its name from the card schemes Europay,
MasterCard, and Visa - the original card schemes that developed it. The standard covers the
processing of credit and debit card payments using a card that contains a microprocessor chip”
(What Is EMV Chip Card Technology?, n.d.).
EMV Liability Shift: “Under rules instituted by MasterCard, Visa, American Express and
Discover, as of Oct. 1, 2015, in-store counterfeit fraud liability shifted to the party -- either the
card issuing financial institution or the merchant -- that had not adopted EMV technology.
Before, credit card issuers were primarily responsible for covering fraud affecting consumer
accounts. While issuers will still reverse charges for fraud victims, they may now seek
reimbursement from the merchant or merchant acquirer if the merchant had not installed EMVcompatible equipment when fraudulent charges were made on an EMV card”
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Encryption: “In credit card terms, encryption is the process of encoding credit card
information for secure transmission through credit card processing networks or across the
Internet” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Face-to-Face Transaction: A face-to-face transaction is one that occurs inside the
merchant’s store and is processed via means of a card-present transaction, which is considered
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by the credit card companies to be the least risky type since the employee has the opportunity to
verify identity of the cardholder during the face-to-face transaction process.
False Positives: “In fraud detection, a "false positive" occurs when something innocent is
wrongly deemed suspicious. Credit card holders encounter false positives most often occurs
when a cardholder accidentally trips the card issuer's fraud detection system. Card issuers have
developed sophisticated, automated fraud detection systems that work by detecting activities and
patterns associated with fraud, but these systems don't work perfectly. False positives can cause a
cardholder's transaction to be denied or an account locked down”
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
FDE: FDE stands for “Forensic Document Examiner” and is a professional that studies
handwriting and can determine with expertise the differences between spurious signatures and
handwriting and genuine signatures and handwriting for legal purposes. FDE’s are often called
upon in court to testify as to the validity of a document in question. For the purpose of this thesis
research, the guardian at the POS terminal is called upon by the Visa and MasterCard regulations
to fill the role of the FDE in store to visually compare the signatures on the back of the card to
that of the government issued identification presumed to be bearing a genuine signature.
Fraud Alert: “A fraud alert is a security alert placed on a credit card account or credit
bureau listing by either the customer or the issuer when a fraudulent account activity is either
experienced or suspected” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Fraudulent Transaction: “A fraudulent transaction is one unauthorized by the credit card
holder. Such transactions are categorized as lost, stolen, not received, issued on a fraudulent
application, counterfeit, fraudulent processing of transactions, account takeover or other
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fraudulent conditions as defined by the card company or the member company”
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Fraudulent User: “A fraudulent user is an individual who is not the credit cardholder or
designee and who uses a credit card account to obtain goods or services without the cardholder's
consent. (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Genuine Signature: A genuine signature is a signature that has been created by the
person whose name the signature bears. It is a forensic document examination term that declares
the true handwriting of the legitimate party involved. In this thesis, a genuine signature refers to
the signature of the account cardholder on the back of the credit or debit card and verified by the
genuine signature on the government issued photo identification.
Hacking: Hacking is the act of a person or persons involved in a crime ring who secretly
gain access to a computer system in efforts to steal information. In this thesis, hacking can also
refer to the actions of those who use skimming or shimming devices in order to gain access to
legitimate account information of cardholders, for purposes of stealing the information to make
fraudulent cards and purchase merchandise from retail stores illegally.
Identity Theft: “Identity theft, commonly shortened to ID theft, is generally defined as
the use of personal information to commit fraud. The personal information used can vary; the
more personal information a thief has, the greater the financial damage that can be caused.
Identity theft can happen in many ways, through account hijacking, ‘phishing,’ dumpster diving
or, sadly, by relatives stealing personal information” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Magnetic Stripe: “A stripe of magnetic information that is affixed to the back of a plastic
credit or debit card. It can be black, brown or silver in color. It is the common type of card in the
United States today. Often, it's called a ‘magnetic swipe’ card, because the card is activated by
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swiping it through a device that can read the data in the stripe. The credit card's magnetic stripe
contains three tracks of data. Each track is about one-tenth of an inch wide. The first and second
tracks in the magnetic stripe are encoded with information about the cardholder's account, such
as their credit card number, full name, the card's expiration date and the country code. Additional
information can be stored in the third track. With the new generation of credit cards, such as chip
cards, no magnetic stripe is needed. Also called magnetic strip or magstripe”
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
MasterCard card: “A card that bears the MasterCard symbol, enabling a MasterCard
cardholder to obtain goods, services or cash from a MasterCard merchant or acquirer.
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Merchant Agreement: “A merchant agreement is a document that lets merchants accept
credit cards. It is a contract between a merchant and a bank and it lays out their respective rights,
duties and warranties regarding how each will handle bank card activity”
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Not Valid: A credit or debit card is considered “not valid” for purchases by Visa or
MasterCard if it has not been properly and genuinely signed by the legal cardholder of the
account on the back of the card within the signature strip. Near the strip reads the wording,
“AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE – NOT VALID UNLESS SIGNED.” If the card is not valid,
rules and regulations require that the card must be signed in the presence of the cashier at the
POS terminal and the customer must show proper government issued photo identification
bearing the genuine signature of the cardholder for visual comparison.
Phishing: “Phishing is a criminal technique that uses computers to steal credit or debit
card or bank account information. Consumers often see phishing attempts in the form of fake e-
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mails that mimic those of banks. Consumers who click on such copycat e-mails will be
transferred to a phony site that will try to dupe them into entering Social Security or bank
account numbers” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
PIN: “A PIN, or personal identification number, is a series of digits (usually four) used to
verify the identity of the holder of a card. The PIN is a kind of password. Consumers often may
choose whether to authorize a debit card transaction by signature or PIN; while it may make no
difference to consumers, the choice means they are choosing different transaction processing
systems” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
POS: “The ‘point of sale’, or POS, is the location in a merchant's establishment at which
the sale is consummated by payment for goods or services received. It is also where many
retailers offer their store's credit card applications to consumers”
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
RAM scraping attack: “A process in which thieves hack a merchant's point-of-sale
system and search its memory for payment card data while it is still being processed inside the
terminal” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
RAT: RAT or Routine Activities Theory is a criminology theory developed by two
theorists, Marcus Felson and Lawrence Cohen (1979) that describes how crime must have three
key elements in order to occur in our daily activities. These three elements are: 1) Suitable
Targets, 2) Absence of Capable Guardianship, and 3) Motivated Offenders. (See Figure 1.
Crime Triangle for reference.) According to Felson and Cohen, RAT can explain many crimes,
particularly theft. By manipulating one of the elements of the crime triangle, crimes can be
prevented. RAT is used to explain the theory behind this research thesis, and is demonstrated by
the research itself in confirming the absence of the capable guardianship at the POS terminals
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during face-to-face in store transactions with card in hand affording ample opportunities for back
of card to be checked for proper signature and verified by proper identification, as mandated by
Visa’s and MasterCard’s rules and regulations via merchant agreement contracts. Thus, if the
absence of capable guardianship continues, the crime of identity theft and plastic card fraud
continues; if the presence of capable guardianship replaces the absence, then the crime is
deterred.
RFID: “Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology is increasingly used in
everything from library books to key fobs that let office workers in their buildings to credit
cards. They transmit very short range radio signals that a receiving device reads before it decides
whether to let you check out a book, get to your cubicle or pay for that venti Cinnamon Dolce
Frappuccino” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Security Code: “The security code on a credit card is the brief number that is printed on
the card that helps verify its legitimacy. Depending on the card, the security code can be a threedigit or four-digit number, printed on either on the back of the card or the front, and goes by
several names. The most common is CVV, which stands for ‘card verification value’ code. Other
card issuers call their security codes CVV2 (Visa), CVC2 (MasterCard) or CID (American
Express)” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Shimming: Shimming is an act of using a shimmer device, as those found last summer in
Mexico at ATM machines, that sits between the EMV chip on the card and the chip reader to
record the data on the chip as the card is being read by the ATM or POS terminal (Krebs, 2015).
Signature Strip: “A signature strip is an area on the back of a card coated with a white or
gray material that holds ink. Imprinted above it are words to the effect of ‘Authorized signature,
Not valid unless signed.’ Some people write ‘Show ID’ in place of their signature, in an effort to
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discourage unauthorized use. While that may work in practice, merchants are not supposed to
accept such cards” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Skimmer: “A credit card skimmer is a small device that lets a thief swipe a magnetic
stripe credit card and surreptitiously record the information on it. A skimmer can be hand-held or
installed where you would expect a legitimate card reader, such as an ATM machine or a gas
pump” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Skimming: “Skimming is a method of stealing credit card information by using a small
electronic device that scans and stores card data from the magnetic stripe. It can be done
manually by a corrupt retail store employee who surreptitiously skims customers' cards, or by
criminals who place a skimming device on top of a regular credit card reader (usually at gas
stations or ATMs machines). Stolen credit card information can be used to make fraudulent
purchases online or to clone new cards” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Smishing: “Smishing is a technique used by criminals to steal bank or credit card
information using text messages. In such an incident, the mobile device user receives a fake text
message that appears to be from a bank. The text message may request that the consumer call a
phone number to provide card or account information to a criminal posing as a bank employee”
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Spurious Signature: A spurious signature is a signature that is not genuine. The
terminology relates to questionable signatures in the field of forensic document examination. In
this thesis, it relates to the unsigned credit or debit card that would require a genuine signature,
verified by identity documentation, in the presence of the capable guardian at the POS terminal,
or failure to do so. If the cardholder and user provided a signature that was not able to be
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visually comparable to that on a government issued photo ID, then it would be considered a
“spurious signature.”
Supercontrollers: For the purposes of this thesis, “Supercontrollers” are referred to as the
employees (and managers training the employees, as well as merchants who are responsible for
their employees). This definition expounds upon the idea set forth by theorists Sampson and Eck
who argue “that not only should managers and employees act as guardians, but also act as “super
controllers” (2010, p. 37). In their article, “Super controllers and crime prevention: a routine
activity explanation of crime prevention success and failure,” Sampson et al. raise awareness as
to why people and organizations take (or fail to take) preventative action against crime (Bowers
& Johnson, 2006; Knutson, 2006; Laycock, 2006 all as cited in Sampson & Eck, 2010, p. 37).
Synthetic Identity Theft: “Synthetic identity theft is when a fraudster creates a new and
fictional identity from fake information or from combining some real identifying information
with inaccurate or false information. Once crafted, the unreal synthetic identity is used to
establish real bank accounts” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Terminal: For this thesis, a terminal is defined as the location of the register where the
point-of-sale (POS) occurs. It is referred to throughout this body of text as the “POS terminal.”
This research accessed two specific terminal locations: 1) Electronics counters located in the
back of individual retail stores used primarily for electronic purchases, and 2) Front registers
located in the front end of each retail store used for general purchases, primarily non-electronic
purchases. (See Table 3. POS (Point-of-Sale Terminal Location within Store during Face-toFace Transactions for reference.)
Transaction: “(1) Any agreement between two or more parties that establishes a legal
obligation. (2) The act of carrying out such an obligation. (3) All activities affecting a deposit
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account that are performed at the request of the account holder. (4) All events that cause some
change in the assets, liabilities or net worth of a business. (5) An action between a cardholder
and a merchant or a cardholder and a member that results in activity on the cardholder account”
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Two-factor Authentication: “Two-factor authentication is a form of identification often
used in making sure a credit card transaction is authorized. Typically one factor may be a
physical object (such as having a credit card in your possession), another may be a piece of
knowledge (such as a PIN number or security code number), and yet another may be a unique
characteristic (such as a fingerprint, an iris pattern or the ability to retype a sequence of numbers
and letters). The presence of two factors allows a two-factor authentication”
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Unsigned Card: An unsigned card is plastic card used for payment that the legal
cardholder and account owner has failed to sign. Many people do not sign the back of their cards
for fear of someone imitating their signature, but write “See ID” instead in the strip. This is still
considered an unsigned card and does not validate the card for payment processing. The
unsigned card is mandated by Visa and MasterCard rules and regulations to be signed in the
presence of the cashier and verified by government issued photo identification bearing a genuine
signature for general visual comparison purposes, before the transaction can legally occur.
However, this practice has been and continues to be neglected in day to day practices at retail
store POS terminals.
User Authentication: “User authentication is the process of validating a credit card user's
identity or authorized user status. User authentication is an important part of a merchant's duties

37

in accepting credit card, although in practice, authentication has in recent years become often
cursory or nonexistent” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
Valid: For the purposes of this thesis, valid refers to the credit or debit card bearing a
genuine signature by the legal cardholder, and account user, written in the signature strip on the
back of the plastic card near the words, “Authorized signature, not valid unless signed.”
Visa Card: “A card that bears the Visa symbol and which enables a Visa cardholder to
obtain goods, services or cash from a Visa merchant or acquirer, and have the transaction
processed through its network. Visa does not itself issue credit or debit cards, but partners with
card-issuing financial institutions” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Theory
How can one effectively and solely ‘guard’ one’s bank accounts and credit card property
sufficiently in a world rapidly and continuously advancing in technologies—even amongst the
underground crime ring world? Despite the fact that laws have been enacted as guardians, and
credit card companies continually add more security features to act as capable guardians,
including the newest one of the EMV chip technology to institute safeguards, it is apparent that
law, current security features and policy changes in and of themselves cannot entirely curtail
identity theft and card fraud. There is still an overwhelming absence of capable guardianship.
This phenomenon can best be explained by the routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979)
that was first developed by criminologists Marcus Felson and Lawrence Cohen using a triangular
model, which represents the convergence of three essential ingredients necessary for crime to
take place—motivated offenders, suitable targets, and an absence of guardianship (see also:
Felson, 1995; Felson 2002, 2006; Felson & Boba, 2010; Felson & Clarke, 1998). Bernburg and
Thorlindsson (2001, pg. 546) report that several attempts have been made to study “routine
activities with individuals as the unit of analysis” and these studies support the hypothesis that
“deviant events are more likely to occur when routine activities, such as simply using one’s
credit card on a routine basis for purchases, increase the convergence” of time, space, absent
guardianship at several different level, availability of suitable targets, and motivated offenders
(Hawdon, 1996; Lasley, 1989; Massey et al., 1989; Miethe et al., 1987; Mustaine & Tewksbury,
1998a, 1988b, 1988c; Osgood et al., 1996; Sampson & Woolredge, 1987).
Ronald Clarke and Marcus Felson (1998) make an important transition from
criminological studies of offenders to detailed analysis of criminal events and criminal activities
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with their “crime triangle” (Lilly et al., 2011, p. 339). Together they explain the crime triangle
based upon a rational choice perspective of offending as techniques of situational crime
prevention. Routine activities theory was founded by Cohen and Felson (1979) describing how
crime needs three essential ingredients to occur: motivated offenders, suitable targets, and an
absence of capable guardians. Crime needs a convergence in space and time for all three to
occur simultaneously. If one of the elements is missing, then crime cannot occur, according to
the Cohen and Felson “crime triangle” model (1979). This means that a crime can be prevented
by keeping motivated offenders away from suitable targets “at specific points in time and space”
or “by increasing the presence of capable guardianship,” (Kleemans et al., 2012, p. 87). By
increasing efforts, increasing risks, reducing rewards, reducing provocation, and removing
excuses valiant efforts can be made to prevent specific crimes that can occur during routine
activities of everyday life (Kleemans et al., 2012, p. 87-88). One particular area of crime that
occurs in everyday life of American consumers, which is in great need of prevention and
intervention by capable guardianship, is that of identity theft and credit/debit bank card fraud.
This crime can best be explained theoretically by routine activities theory (Cohen & Felson,
1979). Routine activities theory has been applied by various criminology researchers in efforts
to explain a variety of crime issues for more than 30 years (Boetig, 2006, p. 12). These include
robbery, rape, residential burglary and theft (Boetig, 2006, p. 13-14). This paper will extend the
application of routine activities theory from physical thefts to include stealing from remote
locations as will be described in methods of identity theft and credit card fraud. Applying the
routine activities theory approach, this thesis has attempted to explain how this phenomenon’s
various aspects are completely understood by using this criminological theoretical structure.
Understanding this theory is critical to investigating and understanding credit card fraud.
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Credit Card Fraud
For many years now, it has been a known fact that credit card fraud has become a
growing problem not only within the United States, but also within the international global
economic community. According to the latest statistics published by the U.S. Department of
Justice in their recent publication of Victims of Identity Theft, 2014 alone an “estimated 17.6
million persons, or 7% of all U.S. residents age 16 or older, were victims of one or more
incidents of identity theft,” up from the 16.6 million persons reported in 2012 (Harrell, 2015).
Surprisingly, two-thirds of these suffered direct financial loss of $99 or less that involved
fraudulent plastic card purchases. Accumulatively, “direct and indirect losses from identity theft
totaled $24.7 billion in 2012” (Harrell, 2013). There is an estimated minimum loss of 800 billion
English pounds per year due to credit and debit card fraud worldwide (Gee et al., 2010 as cited in
Papadopoulos and Brooks, 2011, p. 222). Interestingly enough, 71% of all worldwide revolving
credit cards in operation today were issued in the US, according to FBI Special Agent Slotter,
who served as a CPA in the New Haven, Connecticut Field Office (Slotter, 1997, p. 2). In the
United States alone, Visa and MasterCard reported a loss of $875 million US dollars in 1995
(Slotter, 1997, p. 2). With credit and debit cards rapidly replacing cash and check transactions
for many businesses, new opportunities are presented daily for exploitation. The American
Bankers Association reported that 45% of US consumers used less cash and more plastic
payment methods between the years of 2004 and 2006 (Smith, 2007, p. 37). Consumerism is a
cultural way of life in America, but it appears using cash for transactions are becoming less of a
tradition. As many gluttonous American consumers, having insatiable appetites (Durkheim,
1951) are attempting to maintain popular consumerist lifestyles, people of this country are
extremely vulnerable. Oftentimes, many have easily fallen prey to victimization by others in
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deviant acts of fraud unknowingly. As legitimate credit or bank debit card owners, people are
advised to diligently and vigilantly protect their personal identifying information and property
from identity thieves and potential credit/debit card fraudsters, and to check their accounts
regularly. Educational efforts are made by the CIA in distribution of brochures for bank
customers intended to teach one how to maintain financial security and prevent identity theft
resulting in potentially costly damages and fraudulent purchases to an owners’ accounts. This
education has helped raise awareness and consciousness about the prevailing issue of identity
theft and card fraud. More recently, a number of news reports have aired raising awareness to
the public as well. However, in today’s technologically advanced global society of economics—
readily accessible to the criminal—it appears this type of self-guardianship is not sufficiently
adequate, leaving a tremendous deficit of capable guardianship of one’s own identity, as well as
one’s own financial information and security.
Intertwined Problem of Identity Theft
The severity of credit card fraud cannot be properly understood without first having a
thorough understanding of identity theft. Identity theft, which acts a predecessor to plastic card
fraud, has quickly become “the most prevalent financial crime in the United States” (White &
Fisher, 2008, p. 3). Identity theft can occur on various levels including individual offenders, cooffenders, and organized crime group offenders. Identity theft can be defined as the unlawful
use of another’s personal identifying information whether it be name, address, social security
number, government passport number, driver’s license number, biometric information, bank
account or credit card account information in attempt to gain access to services or finances with
criminal intent (Allison et al., 2005, p. 19). Various criminologists propose different theories to
explain the crime of identity theft, which will be discussed in the following section. Professor
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Robert Clarke (1994) developed the current theory of human identification to explain the crime
of identity theft and defined it as “the association of data with a particular human being”
(LoPucki, 2001, p. 95). Clarke (1994) applies his definition of human identification theory as a
comprehensive overview of why humans choose to use another persons’ data to identify
themselves. However, other researchers have explained it in different ways. The following
section will describe criminology theories that others have used to explain the convoluted crimes
of identity theft and financial fraud:
Empirical Studies and Research Theories Explaining Identity Theft
Relatively, little empirical research has been done on “the prevalence of the crime, its
clearance rate by arrest, or the demographic characteristics of the victims and the identifiable
offenders,” but criminologists from the University of South Florida and University of Illinois at
Chicago reported that the typical apprehended offender was “African American, female,
unemployed, working alone, and was unknown to the victims,” who tended to be White males
(Allison et al., 2005, p. 19). An important attempt to explain this type of individual offence with
a routine activities approach is the study of Osgood et al. (1996), which argues that the
motivation to deviate emerges from situations where the deviance is “symbolically and tangibly
rewarding” (Osgood et al.,1996 as cited in Bernburg & Thorlindsson, 2001, p. 547). Applying
this theoretical expansion to explain these typical identity theft offenders in a society that is
wrecked with racist hate crimes and White male supremacy, it is not difficult to understand how
a Black female could become motivated to choose a White male victim as a suitable target for
offense. After all, it is the White males of the American society that represent the majority of
politicians, police and judges who send disproportionate amounts of African American males to
prison, leaving behind many Black females to financially support their children in the absent
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fathers’ places. By attacking White males as suitable targets, the African American females are
not only finding revenge by robbing these men of their identities, but also doing so in a very
“symbolic and rewarding” way—both psychologically and financially.
Two other researchers, Heith Copes and Lynne Veiraitis, from the University of Alabama
at Birmingham and the University of Texas at Dallas respectively, jointly conducted two separate
studies on the bounded rationality of identity thieves and the use of the neutralization theory for
interrogations of identity thieves (Copes & Veiraitis, 2009; Copes, Veiraitis, & Jochum, 2007).
The first of their two studies was conducted in 2007 using the techniques of neutralization
theory, which lists five specific techniques: (1) denial of responsibility, (2) denial of injury, (3)
denial of the victim, (4) condemnation of the condemners, and (5) appeal to higher loyalties
(Sykes & Matza, 1957 as cited in Lilly et al., 2011, p. 103). Using data from 59 federally
convicted identity thieves, they provide illustrations of how information can be used to “develop
functional themes” for police Reid interrogation procedures. Their study attempts to bridge the
gap between theory and application by helping the police interviewers understand the mindset of
the identity thieves and justifications used by them both prior to the crime and after the event in
efforts of obtaining confessions by guilty suspects. Their sample included offenders from ages
23 to 60 years old, with 18 White females, 16 African American females, 2 Asian females, 8
White males, and 15 African American males (Copes et al., 2007, p. 452). Again, there is a
dominant pattern of African Americans, both male and female, disproportionately represented to
Whites, in this sample of convicts. Overall, 35 of these offenders used a minimum of one
neutralization technique while 14 used multiple techniques. The most frequent techniques that
these identity thieves mentioned were: “denial of injury (n=21), appeal to higher loyalties
(n=14), denial of victim (n=9), and denial of responsibility (n=6)” (Copes et al., 2007, p.452).
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One of the most common statements made by the offenders was “I always thought that
just because it was a white collar crime it didn’t hurt nobody,” as they tried to deny causing any
real harm from stealing a person’s identity and credit, while justifying themselves and
neutralizing the act itself (Copes et al., 2007, p.452 ). Others brazenly stated that “Everything
that I did was based on grabbing the identity and then opening separate accounts. It affected
them, but it was different,” (Copes et al., 2007, p. 453). Different in what way, others might ask?
Researchers soon discovered that inside these identity thieves’ criminal minds, it was easy to
justify victimizing a faceless, plastic card. Identity thieves argue that the “only people that
actually lose from their crimes are banks, corporations, and other deserving victims,” (Copes et
al., 2007, p. 453). The identity thieves claim it is only a minor hassle to the victims, and
unauthorized charges can be easily dropped with a few phone calls, warranting reimbursement
by the bank to the victim (Copes et al., 2007, p. 453). As one anonymous offender said it:
Intentionally screw someone over…I couldn’t do it... but corporations, banks,
police departments, government—oh, yeah, let’s go get ‘em. Because that’s the
way they treat you, you know what I’m saying. If they done screwed me over,
screw them. (as cited in Copes et al., 2007, p. 453)
Little do these offenders realize that the costs of their crimes are passed from the banks and
corporations to the customers in forms of higher prices, higher interest rates and taxpayer funded
government bailout assistance programs for re-imbursements. As a result, all people bear the
costs, including the offenders as consumers and taxpayers. Another offender claimed:
I did it for my son. I thought if I had money and I was able to live, have a nice
place to live, and not have to worry about a car payment, I could just start a new
life and that life is for him. (as cited in Copes et al., 2007, p. 453)
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This statement could likely have been made by one of the African American females in the group
of offenders, who as previously described in Allison et al.’s 2005 study, targeted White males to
steal identity in vengeance, as she faced the financial crisis of raising her child alone as a
struggling single parent, in the absence of his father in prison. For single parents, it is easy to
comprehend that desperate times can call for desperate measures, and caring mothers will do
almost anything to provide for their child. However, if a mother takes irrational risks by
committing crime and landing herself in prison, it shows very poor rationale: The child is now
left alone suffering two absent parents, instead of only one absent father. This concept of
rationale leads to the next study of bounded rationality of identity thieves.
In 2009 Copes and Vieraitis explored how offenders’ experiences affected their rational
assessments of risks versus rewards in a cost benefit analysis, which in turn facilitated their
decision to engage in identity theft as an easy, rewarding and a “relatively risk-free way” of
funding their lifestyles (Copes & Vieraitis, 2009, pg. 237). By gaining the offenders’
perspectives and analyzing them through a theoretical rational choice framework (Cornish &
Clarke, 1986), researchers were able to understand what factors influenced their criminal
motivations (see also Clarke & Cornish, 2001). Rational choice theory, fitting hand in hand with
routine activities theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979), and provides solid infrastructural framework to
support the leg of the triangle that represents the motivated offender. Copes and Vieraitis
discuss the various laws which have been enacted since the 1990s, including the Identity Theft
Assumption and Deterrence Act (1998), the Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act (2004), the
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act known as FACTA (2003), as well as the National
Fraud Alert system—an offspring creation of FACTA. According to these researchers’
perspective, all of the laws mentioned above have been applications of routine activities theory:

46

Most current legislation is directed toward creating or strengthening existing consumer
protection laws and is based upon the assumption that potential offenders will be deterred
by increased guardianship over targets or the threat of steeper penalties if caught. (Cope
& Vieraitis, 2009, p.241)
In the same vein of routine activities and rational choice theories, their research revealed the
primary and suspected motivation for offenders instigating identity theft was, of course, the
desire for money (Cope & Vieraitis, 2009, p. 245). As one offender put it, “It’s all about the
money. If there ain’t no money, it don’t make no sense” (as cited in Cope & Vieraitis, 2009, p.
245). Therefore, money is the driving force behind most economic crimes, including identity
theft and credit card fraud. For many of the offenders, the research interviews revealed that
identity theft was an easy way of getting quick cash and “getting high” for those centered on
self-indulgence (Cope & Vieraitis, 2009, p. 246). Other rational choice presented by the
offenders was that of making profitable use of their employee positions of guardians over
another person’s sensitive personal and account information either misusing it themselves or
selling it to others illegally for profit. They conclude their study with principles of situational
crime prevention methods that could send deterrence messages at the point of sale, or scene of
the crime by reducing the attractiveness of the suitable target. Also, they discuss promotional
support of public campaigns designed to create an impression that law-enforcement agencies
consider identity theft, and therefore credit card fraud, a serious crime that promises to be
prosecuted to the fullest extent (Copes & Vieraitis, 2009, p. 250-258). This study strongly
supports the idea of deterrence based situational crime prevention with convergence of space and
time, motivated offenders, suitable targets and lack of guardianship as identified by routine
activities theory.
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Other more recent studies by Australian researchers from the School of Business at
Queen’s University and University of New South Wales, report contrasting findings to those
discussed above (Free & Murphy, 2014, p.1-41). In their personal interviews and study of 37
convicted felons of fraud related to identity theft, results showed that many of these types of
crimes are not predicated upon solo-offending, but rather on co-offending (Free & Murphy,
2014, p. 1-41). This co-offending pattern can also be explained by routine activities theory in
the social context by “opportunities that arise in everyday life,” emphasizing that the sociostructural patterns of people’s routine activities can bring together, or converge, motivated
offenders—rather than just one single offender—with suitable targets lacking capable guardians
(Bernburg & Thorlindson, 2001, p. 543-560). While Cohen’s and Felson’s (1979) routine
activities theory is applied to explain co-offending in this social context, others could explain cooffending by applying Sutherland’s (1949) differential association theory. Differential
association relates one’s opportunity to commit crime to whom one regular associates with
socially, and by whom cultural transmission is attributed. This theory explains the opportunity
of gaining access and knowledge of ‘how’ to commit a specific crime, such as identity theft and
credit card fraud.
Whether it be differential association theory (Sutherland, 1949), techniques of
neutralization (Sykes & Matza, 1972), low self-control (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), or rational
choice theory (Cornish & Clarke, 1986), it is obvious that mainstream criminology has tended to
focus on the offenders rather than the criminal events and criminal activities themselves, as can
be understood and appreciated by the research described above. However, Cohen and Felson
(1979) take a different approach by not necessarily trying to discover the special characteristics
of offenders, but rather the identifying circumstances that facilitate the criminal event. This
approach makes prevention of crime potentially more implementable. It is this approach that
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also explains a wide array of crime architectures, including organized crime rings, which have
been found to commit massive amounts of identity thefts and credit/debit card fraud (Baldwin,
2002, p. 8).
According to Netherland law researchers, Edward Kleemans, Melvin Soudijn, and Anton
Weenink, organized crime research shows that some offenders have quite normal characteristics
as individuals—although, they are involved in serious crimes. These researchers concur with the
routine activities approach to solving organized crime. In an article entitled, “Organized crime,
situational crime prevention and routine activity theory,” seven papers “in which ideas on
situational crime prevention and routine activity theory are applied to issues of organized crime
and terrorism,” (Kleemans et al., 2012, p. 89). All the papers were prepared by researchers for
the Dutch National Police Agency and were presented during a meeting with Ron Clarke of
Trends in Organized Crime (Kleemans et al., 2012, p. 89). Each paper’s special topic discussed
various types of organized crime applying the routine activity approach. One paper revealed
how willing offenders can and do outwit capable guardians (Huisman & Jansen, 2012, as cited in
Kleemans et al., 2012, p. 89). It also discussed the convergence of trailer park settings, making
the group characteristics of social bonds, reputation and culture of silence all instrumental in
creating a void where there is no capable guardian. The void was protected by psychological
barriers further preventing any effective guardianship from developing. It is within this same
context, yet different environment that organized Asian, Latino and African organized crime
rings of identity thieves and credit card fraudsters maintain their void of capable guardians.
Soudijn and Zegers focused their paper on another issue that is highly relative to
organized identity theft and credit card fraud. Their research paper discussed how cybercrime
and virtual offenders, who commit fraud online, converge in physical settings such as local tough
bars to share information as mutual offenders of the same organizational crime ring. By
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reviewing 150,000 posting by 1,846 members, researchers discovered that “hacking accounts and
stealing money is not their biggest problem: the main risk is not leaving traces when wiring the
money into other accounts,” (Soudijn & Zegers as cited in Kleemans et al., 2012, p. 90). The
virtual world of internet organized crime rings makes the concept of space much different than
the physical world. It offers much more barriers and darkness from exposure, while creating the
ultimate void of capable guardianship. It also allows offenders from different parts of the world
to ‘meet,’ ‘rate each other,’ and continue business bilaterally, while they remain completely
shielded from the authorities; in this way, they are able to find suitable co-offenders (Soudijn &
Zegers as cited in Kleemans et al., 2012, p. 90). Finding suitable co-offenders has a snowballing
effect creating large organized crime rings that have a tremendously damaging effect on stealing
identities in mass quantities, as well as stealing money from numerous accounts in exorbitant
amounts. Here is an excellent example of how routine activities theory is applied to explain the
extreme absence of capable guardianship online from hackers who steal identity and credit card
information. Hence, the papers presenting these special organized crime issues underline the
necessity to move beyond the traditional ‘crime triangle’ of motivated offenders, suitable targets,
and the absence of capable guardians, and expand this theory conducting further empirical
research (Felson & Clarke, 2012, as cited in Kleemans et al., 2012, p.91).
Effects of Identity Theft on Card Users
Although identity theft consists of three different types: financial, nonfinancial, and criminal
record—financial identity theft accounts for the largest portion of these three and warrants great
concern for implementing capable guardianship—with losses continually rising from the $2.3
billion estimate reported by the U.S. General Accounting Office in 2002 (Allison et al., 2005, p.
19). In 2003 alone, more than 10 million cases were reported (Gerard, Hillison, & Pacini, 2004
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as cited in White & Fisher, 2008, p. 3). Within the previous 5 years prior to this report, 27
million Americans reportedly had been victims of identity theft (White & Fisher, 2008, p. 3).
Methods used to commit identity theft range from low-tech methods to high-tech methods and
include thefts of wallets, purses, dumpster diving, hacking into databases and personal accounts
online using viruses or decoding techniques, and more prominently by using specialized
equipment (Barker et al., 2008, p. 402-404; White & Fisher, 2008, p.3). In computer-related
identity theft, the offender may be in another part of the state, country or the world (White &
Fisher, 2008, p. 8-15). This is a perfect example of how an absence of capable guardianship over
various people located in different parts of the world, but functioning within an online cyber
world and targeting victims to fraud from other remote locations of the globe, creates massive
opportunities for identity theft and credit card fraud online. This is all accredited to the absence
of capable guardianship concept of routine activities theory. This will be discussed further in a
subsequent section. Hence, most methods of identity theft are not amenable to police
suppression efforts, which condition further exacerbates and demonstrates an absence of formal
guardianship and legal protection over an individual’s identifying account information before
becoming victimized (White & Fisher, 2008, p.4). Laws enacted, that have been previously
mentioned, deal primarily with deterrence and aftermath of fraud, and only yield mild
preventions of true security and protection from attack. Devices, such as skimmers, are used for
stealing legitimate credit card information. Additionally, there is equipment for making
counterfeit credit cards, which is readily available to anyone who wishes to make a small
investment to beat the system (Barker et al., 2008, p. 400-401). The prices range between $300$500 for skimmer devices and $5,000-$10,000 for equipment to manufacture fake credit cards
(Barker et al., 2008, p. 401). Unfortunately, “there have not been any laws or legislation put in
place against the skimming and counterfeit card devices,” (Merchant Account Blog 2006 as cited
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in Barker et al., 2008, p. 403).

More recently, since the new EMV chip technology has been

encrypted into cards, there has been the underground development and sale of “shimmers,”
which are capable of reading EMV chips.
The Challenge of Capable Guardianship
The question posed to the reader: How can one effectively and solely ‘guard’ bank
accounts and credit card property sufficiently any longer in a world rapidly and continuously
advancing in technologies? Although laws, policies and new security features, including the
EMV chip technology, have been enacted to act as guardians, is it feasibly possible? It is
strongly suggested that none of these precautions can entirely stop identity theft and card fraud,
nor effectively deter and curtail it significantly. There yet remains an overwhelming absence of
capable guardianship—and surprisingly at in-store POS terminals during card in hand face to
face transactions with merchant employees—places believed to be the least risky sales venue by
most credit card companies. This phenomenon can best be explained by routine activity theory
(Cohen & Felson, 1979) which was first developed by criminologists Marcus Felson and
Lawrence Cohen using a triangular model, which represents the convergence of three essential
ingredients necessary for crime to take place—motivated offenders, suitable targets, and an
absence of guardianship (see also: Felson, 1995, 2002, 2006; Felson & Boba, 2010; Felson &
Clarke, 1998). Bernburg and Thorlindsson (2001, p. 544-549) report that several attempts have
been made to study “routine activities with individuals as the unit of analysis” and these studies
support the hypothesis that deviant events are more likely to occur when routine activities, such
as simply using one’s credit card on a routine basis for purchases, increase the convergence of
time, space, absent guardianship, availability of suitable targets, and motivated offenders
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Hewson, 1996; Lasley, 1989; Massey et al., 1989; Miethe et al., 1987; Mustaine & Tewksbury,
1998a, 1988b, 1988c; Osgood et al., 1996; Sampson & Woolredge, 1987).
In the absence of sufficient guardianship needed to protect one’s identifying information,
counterfeiting cards are going to continue to become a growing problem according to Katherine
Barker, Jackie D’Amato and Paul Sheridon—researchers at the College of Business, University
of South Florida (Barker et al., 2008, p. 406). Since the effect of fraud costs not only the
victims, but also the entire system of banks, merchants and credit card companies, various fraud
programs have been implemented for deterrence and detection by the same. The guardianship
efforts have expanded from the sole responsibility of the individual and shifted to a broader
system of government through laws, and businesses through protective designs. Visa, American
Express and MasterCard have developed and added more elaborate physical features to
legitimize credit cards. These features have in the past included holograms, fine-line printing,
and ultra-violet pink to reveal the credit card company’s logo under special lighting, thus making
duplication more difficult—but not impossible. Additionally, programs geared toward verifying
legitimate card ownership were launched by implementing CVV codes within the magnetic
strips of the cards. When the card is used at the point of sale, an encrypted CVV code is read by
the POS terminal and transmitted to the issuing bank where the code is verified. This method is
also an attempt to provide more adequate guardianship over the account, and was designed to
protect users’ personal identifying and credit/bank card information. Howbeit the method has
not succeeded in eliminating fraud. Much to everyone’s dismay, these guardianship efforts
promulgated by credit card companies offered only small victories. Cardholders were everincreasingly inundated and trumped by fraudsters with the aforementioned skimming devices,
which can read the magnetic strip, as well as the CVV code on the back of the card, and capture
all the necessary verifiable information (Barker et al., 2008, p. 404). The newest EMV chip
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technology in the process of implementation within the United States is carrying great
expectations that it will tremendously help in curtailing the crimes of identity theft and card
fraud. However, many registers at stores are not equipped to handle these transactions yet,
despite the liability shift that took place, October 1, 2015. The EMV model taken from the
European chip encrypted cards in Europe and the United Kingdom requires both the chip and a
PIN number to be used for purchases. However, this is not the case within the U.S. where even
those companies that have transitioned over to the chip reader do not yet regularly require a PIN
number for the card transaction to be completed as is demonstrated by this research in
subsequent chapters. That said, even PIN numbers assigned specifically to individual
cardholders are able to be easily stolen, and this paper will soon reveal how. The overall picture
is that there continues to be a great absence of capable guardianship, and the word to focus on
here is “capable.”
For instance, a capable guardian in a retail store setting is one that takes all necessary
precautions and steps as outlined by the merchant contract agreement and guidelines of properly
checking for an authorized signature on the back of each consumer’s card during face to face
card in hand transactions. He or she also requires that the consumer sign the card in his or her
presence if the card is blank and unsigned. Subsequently the capable guardian will follow up
with requesting government issued photo identification bearing a genuine signature and will then
make general visual comparisons for similarities or differences between the two signatures.
Additionally, he or she will be actively engaged and aware of suspicious consumer behaviors,
such as those outlined by Visa in their “Card Acceptance Guidelines for Visa Merchants” (2015,
p. 35). Europe nor the United Kingdom massively utilizes the electronic signature capturing
devices that the United States uses for signatures for in store POS transactions, so there is not a
reliance upon these devices for security measures as there is in the United States. Most
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merchants and employees largely use the old fashioned way of each individual employee
visually comparing each handwritten signature of each card purchaser during each transaction
and requiring government issued photo identification—and they do so somewhat consistently no
matter what the specific business establishment genre. This was discovered by this researcher
during travels for an independent study within England and France in the months of May-June,
2014.
The Places a Consumer is at Risk
Based upon the routine activities theory and this principle precedence of the absence of
capable guardianship, efforts have been made by online businesses to warn consumerist
cardholders. Special warning is giving to those who have false sense of security and feel safer
using their bank debit card versus their credit card for transactions. Educating the consumer
about the places which pose the greatest risk and why, Bankrate.com discourages using one’s
bank debit card at four specific places known for victimization (http://www.bankrate.com).
These four places include large department store chains, outdoor ATMs and outdoor pay-at-thepump gas terminals, restaurants, and the World Wide Web (http://www.bankrate.com). The
reasoning behind this rationale is that most of these places lack appropriate guardianship, thus
making them a great suitable target for motivated offenders. Fraudsters can slip around in the
dark to these hot spots for crime, place skimming devices over the real card slots at ATMs and
other terminals such as these, and steal a mega amount of information in a short time. This
makes one’s risk for identity theft and credit card fraud extremely high
(http://www.bankrate.com). “If the public has access to it, then someone has the ability to add
skimming devices to it, position cameras on it and position themselves in a way where they can
surveil it,” (Bell, 2014 as cited online at http://www.bankrate.com).
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Outdoor terminals. For instance, someone can sit from inside a car across the street with
their laptop and antenna receiving and downloading all the pertinent information needed for
debiting and draining one’s account before the victim ever makes it home. By using small
cameras to capture footage of debit card users, while they are entering their personal
identification number, or PIN, the fraudster is gaining free access to the victim’s money
(http://www.bankrate.com). He or she inherently triumphs over the rightful guardianship and
authority of the cardholder and bank, while wrongfully assuming the guardianship role of the
account themselves by interception. Victimization of both the bank and the unaware card holder
occurs as a result. This describes one of the many ways that cardholders can become victims of
credit/debit card fraud while still holding their card in hand. All outdoor credit/debit card
terminals make the legitimate cardholder an open target and unknowingly leave them vulnerable
to attack. According to this website, one is much better off using terminals inside retail outlets or
other high-trafficked, well-lit places (Bell, 2014 as cited online at http://www.bankrate.com).
These places offer guardianship in the way of plenteous customers passing by, and by dispelling
darkness so that a fraudster is less capable of hiding himself and his equipment. As one moves
through each phase of identity theft and credit/bank card fraud, one can better realize and
appreciate the routine activities theoretical underpinning, which best explains this phenomenon
and how the necessary guardianship concept continues to be problematic (Cohen & Felson,
1979).
Restaurants. Another dangerously risky place to use one’s bank debit cards it at
restaurants. This is due specifically to the lack of capable guardianship over one’s card when it
is being processed. It is common procedure for wait staff to take one’s card, usually nestled
within a black vinyl pouch with one’s bill, away from the table and therefore away from the

56

oversight and guardianship of the owner of the card. Once out of sight, the card can be secretly
skimmed on equipment and the entire customer’s credit information is therefore saved for
identity theft and financial fraud. If one is paying with a bank debit card versus a credit card,
this can be even more risky because the wait staff/fraudster can drain the account in one lump
sum before the customer ever leaves the building. Due to the high frequency of this
phenomenon, some restaurant owners have invested in newer equipment that allows the wait
staff to process the plastic card payment directly at the table and completely in the view of the
customer card owner. This whole concept is based strictly upon the routine activities theory,
allowing the customer to maintain capable guardianship over their card and account by keeping
the transactions out in the open and not behind closed doors somewhere else in the restaurant. It
is apparent in this illustration that the absence of capable guardianship, converging with the
opportunity in time and space giving direct access to the customer’s card, allows motivated (and
usually low wage earning waitresses/waiters) ample access and opportunity to commit crimes of
credit/debit card fraud. “Would you care for a side of credit or debit card fraud with your
meal?” is a question that wait staff does not ask the customer, but probably should. In an
interview, McGoey stated that any place where the credit card is out of hand can increase
chances of fraud: “The guy comes to your table, takes your card and disappears for a while, so
he or she has privacy”....giving the person plenty of time to copy your card information
(http://www.bankrate.com).
Online. Another illustration of how routine activities theory is effectively applied to
explain identity theft and credit/debit card fraud is the relationship between the online cyber
world of e-commerce and the potentially damaging effects of hacking, due to absence of capable
guardianship. Online is the number one place that people should not use their credit or debit
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cards, according to the previous source cited. There are multiple ways that data can be
intercepted and compromised by invasive malware software of hackers, without the knowledge
of the consumer—until long after the damage is done. According to Hendi Yogi Prabowo,
researcher for the Centre for Forensic Accounting Studies at Islamic University of Indonesia,
“credit card fraud has become one of the most sophisticated crimes of the world” and that
“global payments fraud statistics suggest that more must be done to address the problem”
(Prabowo, 2011, p. 371). Prabowo compiled studies using primary and secondary data from
payment systems of the “USA, the UK, Australia and Indonesia to conduct historical and
benchmarking analyses to highlight the trends in credit card fraud prevention in four countries,”
(Prabowo, 2011, p. 371). He explained these overall phenomena with the “crime triangle” of
routine activity theory describing the three factors that allow crime to occur: motivated
offenders, suitable target and absence of capable guardianship (Prabowo, 2011, p. 371).
In his article entitled “Building our defense against credit card fraud: a strategic view,”
he references Clarke’s proposal that growth and technology has created new crime opportunities
(Clarke, 2004, p. 55 as cited in Prabowo, 2011, p. 372). Using routine activity theory (Cohen &
Felson, 1979) the author describes how another criminology theorist, Yar (2005), suggests that
online crime expands the terrestrial concept of suitable targets to a whole new complexity that is
significantly different in “value, inertia, visibility, and accessibility” measuring it with a concept
called VIVA (Yar, 2005, . 424 as cited in Prabowo, 2011, p. 372). Of these suitable targets for
online crime, those include the card not present ones. With a changing environment for remote
purchases and cashless society, electronic commerce is replacing an immense number of real
world transactions with virtual world purchases. Other theorists, Newman and Clarke (2002),
propose that these motivated online offenders are driven by “criminogenic attributes of
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information systems” known as SCAREM (as cited in Prabowo, 2011, p. 372). SCAREM is an
acronym that stands for stealth, challenge, anonymity, reconnaissance, escape and multiplicity.
Newman and Clarke propose that the offenders have overwhelming desire to beat the system,
being sneaky and secretive and find that online environment offering great anonymity and thus
“deception is everywhere” [online] (as cited in Prabowo, 2011, p. 373). Escaping the scene of
the crime is easy for the online offender and avoiding detection (“reconnaissance”). This ease
allows for quick and easy multiplication of the offences.
For example, when a hacker managers to steal a bank’s customer account
information he may then use such information to facilitate the commission of
other crimes such as extorting money from the bank for the return of the database.
(Newman & Clarke, 2002; Newman & McNally, 2005, p. 42, as cited in Prabowa,
2011, p. 37)
New crimes emerge from the original crimes of stealing identities and credit/debit bank card
accounts and they are all supported by the crime triangle of the routine activities theory (Cohen
& Felson, 1979). The absence of capable guardianship, along with virtual world suitable targets,
makes for a fertile environment for breeding online bank account crimes. The online world is
now a predominant crime scene for convergence of the victim and offender, yet not in space, but
within a network of the internet systems or perhaps the mail/package delivery system. Reyns
(2010, p. 58) further explains how the motivated offenders and suitable targets do not have to
even converge online at the same time, but can be at different times (as cited in Prabowo, 2011,
p. 373). This expands routine activities theory even further eliminating the element of
simultaneous ‘time’ in order for crime to occur.
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In addition to this, the online environment creates great challenges for law enforcement to
effectively establish guardianship. According to some criminology theorists, the success of
guardianship depends primarily on the guardian’s co-presence with the potential target and the
potential offender at the same time and place (Yar 2005, p. 423 as cited in Prabowo, 2011, p.
373; Tseloni et al., 2004, p. 74). Yar argues that in relation to cybercrime maintaining a social or
physical co-presence is ultimately almost impossible because the offender is highly mobile and
his or her online activities are temporary and irregular, and thus warrants a need for adaption of
the concepts and practices of guardianship to cope with the new environment (as cited in
Prabowo, 2011, p. 373). Using certain analytic programs, some applications of industrial
strength analytics have been employed across a wide variety of activities by certain credit card
companies and banks in attempts to detect, or police, online financial fraud.

Authors Bolton

and Hand of the Institute of Mathematical Studies offered a comprehensive review of how
technological advances using mathematical methodologies can be used to detect fraud once
prevention, or presence of capable guardianship, has failed (Bolton & Hand, 2002, p. 235). In
addition to this statistical fraud detection defense tactic, the US, the President’s Identity Theft
Task Force (2007) issued a strategic plan in April 2007 to tackle the surmounting problem of
identity theft and financial frauds in America. Other countries have been attempting to
coordinate efforts also (Prabowo, 2011, p. 381). Efforts to effectively protect and guard people
from identity theft and credit/debit bank card fraud has been underway for more than a decade,
yet the absence of truly capable guardianship causes this online environment for fraud crimes to
prevail. Online fraud victimization has been contributed to low self-control theory (Gottfredson
& Hirschi, 1990), since some levels of cooperation is often needed between the victim and the
offender with the promise of goods, services or other benefits that may be nonexistent or that the
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fraudster never intends to provide (Holtfretter, Reisig & Pratt, 2008, p. 190). Other studies
exploring the idea of computer crime victimization using other theories including routine
activities theory: Choi’s integrated theories and empirical assessments reported in the JanuaryJune 2008 issue of International Journal of Cyber Criminology, (Choi, 2008); Reyns’ article
published in Crime Prevention and Community Safety situational crime prevention approach to
cyber stalking victimization and preventative tactics for internet users and online place managers
using opportunity theory and (Clarke, 1992, 1997) situational crime prevention (Reyns, 2010, p.
100); and Bossler and Holt’s online activities and malware infection and guardianship using
routine activity theory to explore victimization of data loss of college students and computer
deviant malware making them targets (Bossler & Holt, 2009,p. 400-420). However, in the latter,
both concurred that physical guardianship had little effect and that policy implications needed to
decrease malware victimization in colleges could not focus on physical hardening (Bossler &
Holt, 2009, p.400).
Retail stores. The online environment for credit card fraud contrasts greatly with that of
the physical retail store, yet credit card fraud prevails in these environments as well. A review of
consumer misbehaviors reported in Journal of Business Research (2004), discusses the profound
impact of consumer misbehaviors and the effects it has on merchant employees within the retail
store locations (Fullerton & Punj, 2002, p. 1239-1249). In fact, ABC News reported that those
misbehaviors have subsequently had an impact upon how retail stores, especially large
department stores, such as Walmart, Target. BestBuy, JC Penny’s and Macy’s conduct their
costs and benefits analyses, chalking much of their loss to credit card fraud at the costs of doing
business (Fahmy, 2010 as cited online at http://abcnews.go.com) These stores seem to be highly
targeted for suitability of victimizing due to various reasons: 1) they carry hot brands and

61

popular electronics that can easily be liquidated for quick cash via the Internet or on the street, 2)
they also allow consumers to purchase in-store gift cards using credit or bank debit cards, and 3)
they are “known for their wide selection of goods and anonymity” they offer shoppers
(http://abcnews.go.com). Most importantly, many large chains do not check customer cards for
authorized signatures nor cardholder government issued picture identification bearing a genuine
signature at point of sale terminals during checkouts. Neither do they check signatures for even
limited visual comparison, relying solely upon data captured by electronic signature pads for
fraud detection. This absence of POS checkout guardianship makes fertile soil for credit card
fraud productions. Motivated offenders know this and take full advantage of the opportunities
that these large retail chain merchants offer them, making those stores extremely suitable targets
for credit card crimes. Here is an exemplary illustration of how routine activities theory applies
to identity thieves utilizing someone else’s credit or bank debit card and getting away with the
fraud crimes because no one is acting as a capable guardian at POS terminals. There is a
complete reliance upon new card securities, such as the EMV and e-pads to capture account
information. As long as the payment is not declined, or a red flag does not go up alerting the
employee that the card is stolen, then the consumer’s misbehaviors—in this case credit/debit
card fraud—has no repercussions. This reliance upon the electronic or digitized signature pad
falsely replaces guardianship and can only help serve in fraud detection at a later point in time
when the victim realizes charges to their accounts they did not make. If the fraudster has used
counterfeiting equipment to manufacture fake credit cards using another person’s active and
viable account, then the event could be prevented if the POS employee would simply require
cardholder picture identification at each transaction. According to FBI Agent Slotter, large-scale
counterfeiting operations have developed in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China, with smugglers
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bringing in hologram materials into the US in California (Slotter, 1997, p.3). These fraudsters
prey on victims worldwide due to the absence of capable guardianship in obtaining valid account
information, usually online or in organized crime rings, and then make counterfeit credit cards
and go on shopping sprees buying huge amounts of name brand items for resell on the streets.
No one knows who they are targeting for account information, but it is easy to see why they are
targeting large retail chains at which to shop, which many are international corporations making
overseas access viable.
This research has involved in-store retail shopping with face-to-face transactions using
four alternate cards in hand, to make both electronics and non-electronics related purchases in
efforts to covertly investigate and observe the routine activities of cashiers with customers and
potential fraudsters. The ultimate observation has been to determine if each specific cashier
acted as either a capable or non-capable guardian at the POS terminals within three specifically
targeted large retail chain stores, which are coded for privacy reasons. The goal was to gain
understanding in search for particular themes or trends that are occurring causing the absence of
capable guardianship at POS terminals within retail stores using the routine activities theory
(Felson and Cohen, 1979). The development and implementation of the EMV chip technology
within the United States has created a huge transition within the retail store POS terminal
checkout environment. This researcher wished to observe first-hand how those changes were
affecting merchants and their employees in daily routine activities of accepting credit or debit
cards equipped with this new technology, and collectively analyze those observations to
determine whether or not these merchants were being encouraged to act as capable guardians by
adhering to the Visa and MasterCard guidelines set forth by the companies for card acceptance.
Specifically, were the employees being required to adhere to the policy of securing identity at in-
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store face to face transactions at POS terminals equipped with the EMV readers? What are the
managers doing, if anything, to train their employees to check for proper authorized signatures
and proper comparison of account numbers on the card versus that showing in the system?
Managers, acting as “super controllers” of these stores could thwart much fraud loss by
requiring the cashiers to pro-actively assume the capable guardian role by offering employee
incentives for fraud prevention, rather than simply writing off fraud loss as the cost of doing
business. A great example of how this is implemented is in an essay prepared by a loss
prevention employee for Tops Appliance City, Inc. located in New Jersey and New York, USA.
Barry Masuda, of Tops Appliance, used in intelligence data to train store managers and
employees how to “differentiate between legitimate from illegitimate” cardholder transactions
(Masuda, 1991, p. 121). His efforts yielded a reduction of in-store credit card fraud from
$1,121,000 in 1991 to $200,700 in 1992 by simple implementation of routine activity theory
capable guardianship concepts (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Other theorists have applied rational
choice, situated action and social control of organizations to retail store fraud crimes and argue
that priority should be placed upon safety and the “well-being of the workers, consumers and
general public” making it more challenging for effective guardianship (Vaughan, 1998, p.23).
Sampson and Eck argue, in contrast, that not only should managers and employees act as
guardians, but also act as “super controllers” (2010, p. 37). In their article, “Super controllers
and crime prevention: a routine activity explanation of crime prevention success and failure,”
Sampson and & Eck raise awareness as to why people and organizations take (or fail to take)
preventative action against crime (Bowers & Johnson, 2006; Laycock, 2006; Knutson, 2006 all
as cited in Sampson & Eck, 2010, p. 37). This article effectively expands routine activity theory
(Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson, 2008) to “look at what influences people and organizations to
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take crime prevention action” and conclude that “crime concentrations imply the systematic
failure of at least one form of controller” (Sampson & Eck, 2010, p.47). In other words, the
crime of identity theft and credit and debit bank card fraud has continued to occur in certain
environments, such as those of the large department stores, because there is massive failure to act
as capable guardians or controllers of the environment, and make interception and prevention
possible.
Summary of Literature Review
Based upon the review of material within this paper, there is an obvious need for redefining
capable guardianship. As demonstrated through various applications manipulating many
elements of identity theft and credit and bank debit card fraud, it is equally obvious that R.A.T.,
or Routine Activities Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson, 2008; Felson & Clarke, 1998) is
the most applicable criminology theory for explaining this phenomenon. The absence of capable
guardianship that evades and prevails over fraudulent financial transactions of these kinds needs
serious study and research for future policy implications. A dominant theme throughout the
context of this research paper is that of incapable and/or absent guardianship allowing identity
theft and credit card crimes to continue to grow by leaps and bounds, both within the cyber
world and the real physical world. Conquering this problem will require new methods of
guarding information and transactions. Identity theft and credit and debit card fraud abound
despite the implementation of laws, policies and even new EMV chip technology. The retail,
restaurant and in-store face to face card in hand transactions are at optimal risks despite the
merchants and employees’ ability to properly identify each card paying customer at POS
terminals. Observational field study research is warranted to discover causes as to why this
phenomenon continues to occur.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Purpose of Research Restated
The purpose of this research is to investigate by first-hand field observations the absence
or presence of capable guardianship at point-of-sale (POS) terminals within retail store chains
that are known to be highly targeted for identity theft in conjunction with credit, debit or bank
card fraud. (See pages 61- 62 of this thesis). A majority of bank cards bear the logo of either
Visa or MasterCard. Both Visa and MasterCard mandate certain rules and regulations to be
followed by merchants and their employees as outlined by their merchant agreement contracts
(See Appendices C & D). Banks also have their own specific rules and regulations that are to be
adhered to in order for the merchant to accept the card bearing the Visa or MasterCard logo for
payment (See Appendix B).
Specifically, these rules require that each card must bear the legal cardholder’s genuine
signature on the back of the card within the signature strip that is located below the magnetic
stripe and beside the security CVV code. Either above or below each signature strip located on
the back of each card, are the words that read, “AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE – NOT VALID
UNLESS SIGNED” (See Appendix C). Point-of-sale face-to-face transactions that occur within
retail stores, with card in hand customers, are considered by both Visa and MasterCard to be the
least risky transactions of all because the merchant’s employees have the opportunity to
investigate the identity of the customers paying with a plastic card method, and are required to
do so if the card is not signed. The steps that the employees must follow at the POS terminal
during the transaction are outlined by Bank Rules, Visa, and MasterCard (See Appendices B, C,
& D for details). This investigator believes that the responsibility of acting as a capable guardian
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that is placed upon the merchant and its employees is one that is often neglected and dismissed,
thus it is also a contributing factor to the increase of identity theft related to card fraud.
Review of Research Questions Addressed and Hypotheses
Specifically, the following questions were addressed and hypothesized:
RQ1: The first research question contains five parts: 1) Will the cashier at the point of
sale transaction act as a capable guardian over the face-to-face transaction and act to help prevent
identity theft and credit/debit card fraud by taking the card into his or her hand to visually check
the back of the credit or debit card to see if it bears an authorized signature by the legal
cardholder, or check the account number on the card and compare it to that in the system or
receipt in according to the merchant agreement rules as mandated by the Bank Rules and
Regulations, Visa and MasterCard? (See Appendices B, C, & D). Variables investigated:
2) Will the variables of non-electronic versus electronic purchase increase levels of capable
guardianship? Will there be a difference in the level of capable guardianship if the purchase is
made at the back electronic counter POS terminal versus the store’s front end POS terminal? 3)
Will the amount of higher purchase charges to the card raise levels of guardianship at POS
terminals with electronic purchases compared to a low levels of guardianship for small charges
to the card? 4) Will the variables of time segment of day or night and business or lack thereof
give increase or decrease to the levels of capable guardianship? 5) Will there be a difference of
levels of guardianship based upon gender or race of the employee processing the transaction at
each POS terminal?
Ho1: There will be an overall generalized absence of capable guardianship at the POS
terminals during the face-to-face card in hand transaction, and the cashiers will not act as a
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capable guardians over the card accounts in keeping with Bank Rules, Visa and MasterCard
merchant agreement contracts in efforts to prevent identity theft. They will not take the card in
hand at any point during the transaction to specifically compare the account number listed on the
face of the card to that showing in the system nor will the cashier specifically check the back of
the card to see if it has been validated by an authorized signature. Variable Hypotheses:
2) There will be a slight to significant difference between levels of guardianship when the
purchase is an electronics purchase versus a non-electronic purchase or whether the purchase
was made at the store’s front end register or back electronic counter register. 3) There will be a
higher level of capable guardianship demonstrated by participants at POS terminals when the
charges to the credit card are over $50 versus those under $50. 4) There may be a slight
difference in higher levels of guardianship depending upon the business of the store or lack
thereof.

5) There will be no difference if the cashier is male nor female, Black or White.

Overall, there will be a generalized absence of capable guardianship at the POS terminals within
each store chain by all participants, with higher levels of guardianship being demonstrated only
by those participants processing electronics purchases.
RQ2: Will the cashier at the face-to-face transaction at the POS (point-of-sale) terminal
require the cardholder and purchaser to sign the back of the unsigned card used for purchase, and
will he or she make her show a government issued photo identification for verification of her
identity before the transaction is allowed to be processed through, in keeping with merchant
agreement rules as mandated by Bank Rules and Regulations, Visa and MasterCard?
Ho2: The cashier will not check the back of the card, and therefore, will not check for an
authorized signature validated the card. Consequently, the cashier will neither ask her to show a
government issued photo identification document bearing her genuine signature for comparison
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or verifying her identity before the transaction will be allowed to be processed through to its
entirety. Ultimately, it is hypothesized that the cashier will not abide by the Bank Rules and
Regulations, the Visa merchant rules for accepting unsigned cards, nor the MasterCard rules for
accepting unsigned cards (See Appendices B, C, & D for references).
RQ3: Will the cashier act in lieu of an FDE (Forensic Document Examiner) to
investigate by visual comparison the general similarities or differences of handwriting
demonstrated on the government issued photo identification bearing a genuine signature of the
researcher to that of the unsigned card that should be required to be signed in the presence of the
cashier at the POS terminal?
Ho3: The cashier will not check the back of the card, and therefore, will not check for an
authorized signature validating the card; thus, he or she will neither attempt to ask the researcher
to sign the back of the card nor show government photo identification bearing her genuine
signature, nor will he or she act in lieu of an FDE to investigate by general visual comparison the
general similarities or differences of the handwriting on the government issued identification to
that of the signature on the back of the card per requested signature. The cashier will not request
a signature on the back of the card, and the only signature requested will be that prompted by the
electronic signature capturing device at POS terminal.
RQ4: Will the cashier rely solely upon the electronic capturing device to verify the
signature and not personally look at it himself or herself?
RQ5: Will the participant cashier at the POS terminal solely depend upon the EMC chip
reader technology newly implemented at the POS terminals equipped with such to “guard” over
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the identity of the cardholder, even when neither a PIN number nor signature is required nor
requested for the transaction to be processed?
Ho4 and Ho5: The cashier participant processing the transaction will demonstrate heavy
reliance upon the electronic signature capturing device, if a signature is required, and/or the
EMV chip reader technology to “guard” over the face-to-face card in hand sales transaction at
the POS terminal, whether a PIN is requested or required or not.
Procedures for Collecting Data
Gaining access to each of the 28 stores has been achieved by searching the Internet and
obtaining a computer generated list of these three chains’ store locations within the tri-states of
Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina. A narrower list has been accumulated be sectioning
each state off into bordering regions and searching for store locations within those specific
regions of Eastern Tennessee, Western Virginia, and Northeastern North Carolina and choosing
those that were randomly located along the I-81, I-40, I-75, and I-26 interstate highways. Stores
were randomly selected for patronizing along each individual interstate highway. Shopping
dates consisted of a busy six day period from February 12 through February 17, 2016. This was
a long holiday weekend consisting of Valentines’ Day, Saturday, February 14th and President’s
Day, February 16th. Data was collected by observational studies made during thirty-four (34)
separate transactions at these twenty-eight (28) different store locations randomly selected for
shopping. The researcher alternated between purchasing an electronic related item and paying
for it at a POS terminal located in the back of the store in the electronics department, and
purchasing less expensive non-electronic items from the POS terminals located at the front of the
department store. The purchase amounts ranged from$1.41 (food item) to $246.07 (LG Stereo).
Receipts were saved and an observations report was filled out immediately upon leaving each
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individual store and after each individual transaction occurred to collect and code certain data
(See Appendix A). The construction of the observations report is discussed further at the end of
this chapter. Ideas and evidence that supports hypotheses as to the absence or presence of
capable guardianship existing at POS terminals at these specific department stores emerged from
the field based upon the accumulative observational studies.
Four separate plastic card payment methods were utilized by the researcher as the legal
cardholder and consumer, but all of the signature strips on the backs of these four cards were
entirely unsigned, therefore not valid to be used for purchases unless signed in the presence of
the employee at the POS terminal. Two of the cards bear the logo of Visa, while the other two
bear the logo of MasterCard. Two of the cards were encrypted with EMV chip technology but
also had magnetic stripes; while the other two had security features of magnetic stripes and PIN
numbers. In addition to observational data collected during thirty-four (34) separate face-to-face
card in hand transactions at thirty-four separate POS terminals with thirty-four separate
individual employees occurring within twenty-eight (28) different stores, basic demographics
were also collected regarding the gender, race, and time segment of the day or night, including:
6 am – 12 noon; 12 noon- 6 pm; 6 pm-12 midnight; 12-midnight – 6 am. These variants were
charted to help determine if there was a difference in the employees’ adherence to the store’s
merchant agreement policy depending upon gender, race or the time of day each individual
transaction occurred correlating with the business or lack of business inside the store.
Store Chains and Coding
There were three individual national store chains selected for this research. Two were
chosen based upon their sales and easy access to both electronic products and non-electronics
related items. One was an electronics department store only, but sold inexpensive accessories
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also. All three are large national chains predominantly located within the United States of
America. Some of these chains are also located internationally and called by different names,
although they are still owned by the associates of the same companies located within the U.S.
All three store chains were also known to be reported as highly targeted for identity theft and
card fraud. To protect the privacy of each individual store chain and location and to prevent
incrimination of individual employees of these three individual store chains, a coding system has
been implemented. For this reason, the three chains have been coded as Store Chain #1, Store
Chain #2, and Store Chain #3. No specific information has been reported on the individual store
names nor locations in the observations reports (See Appendix A). Locations have been coded
within each individual state where each store was located and each transaction occurred, and the
choices included those states within the region investigated: Tennessee, North Carolina,
Virginia or Georgia.
Participants at POS Terminals
Furthermore, no personal identifying information has been collected on specific
employees at POS terminals, nor has it been discussed in this research thesis. Participants of
these three individual store chains were required to be over the age of eighteen in order to be
eligible for employment at each store, due to its being a national chain; therefore, all
participants at POS terminals were considered adults for research purposes. The participants
were randomly chosen by location of the POS terminal in which the purchase was being made,
and the participant was working. Thus, if the item was considered to be an electronics related
item, then the researcher sought to process the transaction at the electronics POS terminal
normally located in the back each store in the electronics department. If the item purchased was
considered to be a non-electronics related item, then the researcher sought out a POS terminal
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located at the front of the store to process the face-to-face transaction. The participants at the
front POS terminals were chosen by randomly noting which terminal had the shortest line at the
time the sales transaction occurred. The demographics of gender and race only of each
participant were recorded on the Observations Report (See Appendix A).
Purchases
Thirty-four (34) individual purchase transactions occurred at thirty-four (34) individual
POS terminals. The goal was to purchase as many non-electronics related items that were
inexpensive and compare the observations to the near equivalent number of electronics related
items purchased that were more expensive. The purpose of this distribution was to observe the
differences in the guardianship levels initiated by the participants at the POS terminals during
each electronic or non-electronic related transaction. Most electronic transactions have certain
stipulations that require added security. For example, electronics items must be returned within
fourteen (14) calendar days versus the usual thirty to ninety days, as stated on receipts and as
determined by each individual store chain policy.
Electronic items are also highly targeted by identity thieves and fraudsters because they
are high in demand and easy to liquidate either on the street or online, according to the statement
of the problem and the research cited in the literature review of this thesis (See Ch. 1 & Ch. 2 for
references). For this reason, some electronics items are placed within locked security cases or are
locked down on the shelves with security cables, and require the assistance of a sales associate,
who subsequently often acts as the cashier at the POS electronics terminal. All of these
measures are taken in efforts to help prevent stolen merchandise from leaving the merchant’s
store. It was hypothesized by this researcher that there would be higher levels of guardianship
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by the participants at POS terminals located at the electronics counters at the back of each store
specifically used for processing electronics related purchases (See Ho1).
Payment Methods and Security Features of Cards Used
Four individual credit/debit cards were utilized for the thirty-four (34) individual
transactions. They were not used in equal distribution, but selected and used in unequally
distributed proportions. The reason being: Two of these plastic payment cards were encrypted
with the new security feature introduced into the U.S. based upon the European model of the
EMV chip and pin technology. The two other cards consisted of features of the magnetic stripes
only as a method of being read for transaction processing. The researcher determined after
visiting the first three stores in each one of the respective chains, that they were making or had
already made the transition to technology equipped to read the EMV chip in the card. That said,
the researcher made the rational choice to primarily observe and test the guardianship levels of
participants at POS terminals equipped with the new readers as mandated by the EMV Liability
Shift that occurred as of October 1, 2015 by Visa’s, MasterCard’s, American Express’s and
Discover’s rules (See p. 26-27 in Ch. 1’s Definition of Terms). Since only two of her credit
cards were encrypted with the new EMV chip card technology, she opted to utilize these for
most purchases despite that they were both bearing the MasterCard logo. The two bearing the
Visa logo were utilized least, because neither were yet encrypted with the EMV chip technology.
Construction of Observations Report
The construction of the observations report (See Appendix A) was based upon several
criteria that were intended to be observed and recorded by the researcher during her field studies
and transactions as an American card paying consumer. These criteria included the following: 1)
the code for each store chain and state in which it was located, 2) the time that actually
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transaction took place coded into a category of one to four segmenting the twenty-four (24) hour
cycle of each date, 3) the demographics of gender and race only of each individual participant at
each POS terminal transaction occurred, 4) the location of each individual POS terminal
specified in front of store for general purchases and in back of store for electronics related
purchases, 5) whether the item purchased in each transaction was electronics related or nonelectronics related, 6) the amount of charges incurred on each specific card utilized for each
transaction, 7) the individual security features that were utilized by the technology equipped at
each POS terminal, 8) the individual level of guardianship initiated by the participants
processing the sales transaction at each POS terminal. Additional information and notes were
obtained and recorded if warranted by normal daily activities routine conversations occurring
during the transaction process.
Coded Chain Store Location and Number (#)
Three specific national retail store chains were patronized for shopping with an
accumulative totaling twenty-eight (28) individual store chains visited by the researcher as a
consumer making face-to-face card in hand transactions. Each store and location was coded as
either being “Store Chain #1, Store Chain #2, or Store Chain #3,” for privacy purposes.
Attempts were made to patronize each of the specific store chains #’s 1-3 in somewhat
equivalent proportions, depending upon accessibility within each state in the region investigated.
The location of each store was classified according to the state in which the business was
located, and the choices were: Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia.
Time Segments Transactions Occurred
Time segments were categorized as occurring within one of the following: 1) Segment
1—meaning the transaction time fell between 6:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon, 2) Segment 2—
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meaning the transaction time fell between 12:00 noon and 6:00 p.m., 3) Segment 3—meaning
the transaction time fell between 6:00 p.m. and 12:00 midnight, or 4) Segment 4—meaning the
transaction time fell between 12:00 midnight and 6:00 a.m. Exact times of transactions were not
recorded in efforts to protect the cashier participants’ personal identifying information from
being revealed as receipts record exact times and names of cashiers and/or numbers of exact POS
terminals transactions occur. All efforts were made to prevent any personally incriminating
information to be reported on the observations report sheets (See Appendix A). Meanwhile,
times were categorized into quarterly segments to demonstrate any differences in levels of
guardianship efforts made by POS cashiers during non-busy shopping hours as compared to busy
shopping hours. According to Visa’s Card Acceptance Guidelines for Visa Merchants rules
located in Section 2: Card-Present Transactions, merchants are to train their employees to be
aware of card transactions made specifically right after the store opens and/or just before the
store closes as these times tend to be when much fraud occurs (p. 35). This also indicates the
store’s being busy or not busy. Usually stores are not very busy as soon as the store opens or
just before it closes as most customers do not patronize stores immediately upon opening nor
closing.
Demographics of Participants at POS Terminals
The demographics of participants records only the gender and race of each cashier that
processed each transaction. The purpose of recording gender was to determine if there were
differences in levels of guardianship dependent upon sex. For example, if the cashier were a
male versus a female, would natural guardianship instincts or efforts be greater, or vice versa.
The purpose of recording race was determine if race was a contributing factor in awareness of
identity theft and card fraud, and thus vigilance or lack of vigilance in practices of higher or
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lower levels of guardianship at retail store POS terminals in efforts to prevent it. One study cited
earlier in this thesis in Chapter 2, Literature Review stated that Black African American women
targeted White Caucasian males as victims (See pages 43-44 of this thesis).
Location of POS Terminal within the Stores
Each POS terminal location was recorded as either being located at the back of the store
in the electronics department being located at the front of the store. Back of store electronics
POS terminals were utilized primarily for sales transactions involving electronics related items;
while front of store POS terminals were utilized primarily for sales transactions involving nonelectronics related items. Depending upon the time segment category in which the purchase was
made, there was either adequate employees staffed to access both types of POS terminals, or
only front of store POS terminals, if employee staff numbers were low during certain shopping
hours. The purpose in recording the POS terminal location as either back of store electronics or
front of store general was to determine if there were differences in efforts and levels of capable
guardianship by participants at each type of terminal, based upon training and requirements for
those operating the POS terminals pertaining to electronics purchases compared to training and
requirement for those operating POS terminals used for general non-electronic purchases.
Electronic vs. Non-Electronic Items
Each individual transaction was recorded as either being an electronics related item
meaning it was sought out and obtained from the electronics department of the specific retail
store, or it was recorded as being a non-electronics related item. The purpose of recording
whether the item purchased by card payment method was either electronics related or nonelectronics related was to determine the differences in guardianship efforts made during the faceto-face card in hand in store sales transaction if the item was an electronics related item versus a
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non-electronics related item. According to the review of the literature cited in Chapter 2 of this
thesis, electronic items are highly targeted by identity thieves and card fraudsters because these
items are in high demand and are easily liquidated either on the streets or online (See page 62).
It stands to reason that guardianship efforts would be assumed to be greater for electronic
purchases, and it was hypothesized that they would be (See page 69). In order to test this
hypothesis, it was required to record whether each individual item was electronics related or
non-electronics related.
Amount of Charges to Specific Card Used
The exact amount of each charge applied to each card account was recorded on the
Observations Report for each individual transaction. The purpose of recording each exact
amount was to document any differences of efforts of guardianship providing the charges were
higher in amount compared to lower in amount. It was assumed and hypothesized that the
higher charges would warrant higher levels of guardianship efforts by the participants at the POS
terminals (Ho1). The amount of the specific charge related to each individual face-to-face card
in hand sales transaction was a determining criteria as to whether or not the system required the
researcher as cardholder and purchaser to provide an electronic signature on the capturing
device. Retail stores often require a signature if the amount charged to the card is above a
certain predetermined threshold. Conversely, a signature is often not required by a system
whose threshold is set below a certain predetermined amount charged to the card. Charges were
calculated accumulatively to each specific card made over the six (6) day shopping period.
Card Being Used for Transaction and Coding
A total of four individual credit/debit cards were utilized in unequal distribution for all
accumulative transactions. Reasons for unequal distribution of card use is discussed in depth in
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the previous section entitled, “Payment Methods and Security Features of Cards Used,” (See
pages 73-74). Primary criteria recorded on the observations reports notated if the card itself bare
either Visa’s or MasterCard’s logo, as these were the only two types accounts of which the
researcher had legal ownership. Two of the cards used were Visa, while the other two were
MasterCard. The two Visa cards were equipped with magnetic stripes only, while the two
MasterCard cards were encrypted with magnetic stripes and EMV chip technology newly
introduced into the US and able to be read by merchants who have made the transition to use
POS terminals equipped with EMV chip readers, per the EMV liability shift requirement as of
Oct. 1, 2015. The researcher’s legal name and card account number, as well as expiration date
were on the front of each card, along with the logo; and on the backs of each card were security
CVV codes located next to the blank signature strips. The researcher did not sign any of these
four cards to make the cards “valid” for purchases as mandated by Visa and MasterCard rules
and regulations: “AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE – NOT VALID UNLESS SIGNED,” in bold
capital letters above or below each unsigned signature strip (See Appendices C & D). The
security features of each card were noted on the observations reports as well as the specific card
that was used. However, the last four digits printed on each sales transaction receipt were
renumbered for privacy purposes and coded as either ending in “1111,” “2222,” “3333,” or
“4444.”
Guardianship Efforts of Participant Employees
The questions asked on the observations report regarding the guardianship efforts of each
individual participant employee at each POS terminal addressed the following : 1) Did the
cashier take the credit/debit card in hand to check anything at all, including but not limited to the
account number or CVV code? 2) Did the cashier notice and state that the card was not signed
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to the researcher as card paying customer? 3) If so, did the cashier ask her to sign the card in the
cashier’s presence as mandated by merchant agreement contracts and bank rules (See
Appendices B, C, & D). 4) If the cashier requires the unsigned card to be signed in his or her
presence, does he or she sequential ask the card signer, researcher and card paying customer to
provide her government issued photo identification bearing her genuine signature for
comparative purposes? 5) If all those steps are followed properly, does the cashier demonstrate
efforts to visually compare and contrast generally visible differences, in lieu of a trained FDE,
between the newly signed signature located inside the signature strip on the back of the
previously unsigned card to that of the genuine signature located on the government issued photo
identification provided to the cashier? 6) Were there any additional guardianship efforts
demonstrated by the cashier, such as calling for Code 10, if she believed there to be
discrepancies or reasons to be suspicious of fraud (Based upon guidelines from MasterCard’s
What If Fraud Happens, p. 1)? Any additional efforts were noted in the blanks lines of
“Additional” on the Observations Report (See Appendix A).
Technology Used in Transactions
The technology utilized for each transaction to be completed was recorded as follows:
1) Did the system used at the POS terminal during the face-to-face card in hand sales transaction
request for an electronic signature to be captured by the device? 2) Did the system require the
EMV chip reader to read the account information encrypted into the EMV chip on the card being
used (if card used was equipped with EMV chip technology) or simply slide the magnetic stripe
to read the account information? 3) Did the system prompt for a PIN number to be input before
the transaction could be completed? 4) Did the cashier demonstrate by conversation the
deference of guardianship to the EMV chip reader or to the electronic signature capturing
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device? If so, the words of the cashier were noted in the additional observations section, as
described below.
Additional Notes and Observations
This section of the Observations Report consisted of blank lines to record any additional
information observed or collected as data for research purposes. This included but was not
limited to normal conversations made during the daily routine activities of shopping, checking
out, and paying with a credit or debit card. If the participant cashier at the POS terminal offered
any comments or statements during the transaction, specifically regarding the new EMV chip
reader and technology, they were documented and reported in this section. Any other
information or observations the researcher believed to be pertinent to this study were also
recorded in this section and analyzed for any recurrent themes or trends by accumulative
comments representing recurrent ideology.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH FINDINGS
A total number of twenty-eight (28) individual major department stores combined,
located within Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia were patronized as a normal
paying customer and observational studies were made during a total accumulation of thirty-four
(34) point of sale purchase transactions with thirty-four (34) individual cashiers, involving the
payment method of plastic credit/debit cards, with actual amounts ranging from the least
expensive (food) purchase of $1.41 to the most expensive (LG stereo) purchase of $246.07. The
least expensive purchase of $1.41 was made at store chain #2 using a MasterCard credit card
with chip technology without using a pin nor signature, while the most expensive purchase of
$246.07 was made at store chain #3, using a different MasterCard credit card with chip
technology and electronic signature only, with no pin number required. These thirty-four (34)
individual transactions were made over a six (6) day period from Friday, February 12, 2016 –
Tuesday, February 17, 2016 using four (4) different major credit/debit cards, two of which were
MasterCard and two of which were Visa. None of these four major credit cards were signed with
any mark or signature anywhere on the cards, by the legal cardholder and purchaser nor anyone
else, specifically inside the white strips on the back of the cards provided above or below the
captions on each stating, “AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE – NOT VALID UNLESS SIGNED.”
A total combined amount of $1,730.48 was spent during this six (6) day shopping spree at
twenty-eight (28) different stores within Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia,
accumulating thirty-four (34) different sales transactions with thirty-four (34) different cashier
participants within three (3) separate large department store chains that sell electronics—items
commonly targeted for theft.
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Distribution of Store Chains
Table 1
Region of Coded Store Chains Patronized for Observational Studies
(28 Stores Visited in Total)
Store Chain
Code Number
#1

Tennessee

North Carolina

Virginia

Georgia

11

2

1

1

Total # of
Stores Visited
15 (54%)

#2

4

2

1

0

7 (25%)

#3

3

2

1

0

6 (21%)

All Stores
Combined

18
(64%)

6
(21%)

3
(11%)

1
(4%)

28
(100%)

Distribution of Participants
The researcher selected participant stores from each one of the three major chains of high
volume sales department stores for observational studies during purchases, based upon the
convenience and accessibility of the store locations to the interstates (I-81, I-40, and I-75) within
the Tri-State region and near state lines of Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia. The
participant stores are coded as Chain #1, Chain #2, and Chain #3 depending upon the frequency
of their occurrences along the interstates route and largest to smallest number of stores visited.
The total number of stores and purchases made at Chain #1 in this region combined
accumulative was twenty (20) individual purchases utilizing twenty (20) individual cashiers for
point of sale transactions made at fifteen (15) different store locations within Chain #1. The total
number of stores and purchases made at Chain #2 in this region combined accumulative was
eight (8) individual purchases utilizing eight (8) individual cashiers for point of sale transactions
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made at seven (7) different store locations within Chain #2. The total number of stores and
purchases made at Chain #3 in this region combined accumulative was six (6) individual
purchases utilizing six (6) individual cashiers for point of sale transactions made at six (6)
different store locations within Chain #3.
The individual cashier participants were all legally adults of eighteen years of age or
older based upon each chain’s employee minimum age requirements for hiring. Each front
register cashier was randomly chosen by availability or convenience of the line length based
upon the business of each store visited. Each electronics counter cashier was chosen by
convenience of who was working there at the time of purchase. In some stores, it was difficult to
find anyone working at the electronics counter and front register cashiers were randomly and
conveniently utilized for electronic purchases that did not require an attendant to remove them
from behind a locked glass security case. Other cashier participants were chosen randomly by
whom arrived when the bell at the electronics counter was rang asking for customer assistance to
retrieve items locked in glass security cases and complete point of sale purchase transactions.
Both male and female participants were randomly selected by convenience. These male and
female participants randomly included whites and blacks.

There were a total number of sixteen

(16) male cashier participants, of which three (3) were black and thirteen (13) were white.
Alternately, there were a total number of eighteen (18) female cashier participants, of which four
(4) were black and fourteen (14) were white. There were a total of fourteen (14) female cashiers,
of which three (3) were black and eleven (11) were white: and, six (6) male cashiers, of which
zero (0) were black and six (6) were white at store Chain #1. There were a total of three (3)
female cashiers, of which one (1) was black and two (2) were white: and, five (5) male cashiers,
of which zero (0) were black and five (5) were white at store Chain #2. Finally, at store Chain
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#3, there was a total of one white (1) female cashier that assisted point of sale transaction, and
five (5) male cashiers, of which three (3) were black and two (2) were white. All stores
combined equals thirty-four cashier participants, eighteen (18) females and sixteen (16) males
randomly chosen by convenience. These are the only demographics obtained pertaining to
individuals logged for research purposes, and no further personal identifying information was
gathered during these observational studies in order to protect the privacy and PID of each
individual cashier participant during each point of sale transaction. The purpose in documenting
the demographics of male versus female, as well as black versus white, was to determine if there
is a consistent difference in point of sale practices during transactions involving plastic card
payments of MasterCard or Visa in either’s adherence to merchant agreement policies for
checking for authorized signature on back of card and requiring government issued identification
if the card is not signed.
Table 2
Demographics and Numbers of Participants:
Gender and Race of Cashiers at POS Terminals, Face-to-Face Transactions
Store Chain

Females

Males

Totals

Caucasian
Ethnicity
17

African
American
Ethnicity
3

#1

14

6

20

#2

3

5

#3

1

All Stores
Combined

18
(53%)

20 (59%)

8

7

1

8 (24%)

5

6

3

3

6 (18%)

16
(47%)

34
(100%)

27
(79%)

7
(21%)

34
(100%)
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Totals

Distribution of POS Terminals
Table 3
POS (Point-of-Sale) Terminal Locations within Stores Utilized for Face-to-Face Transactions
POS Terminal
Location in Store
Chain
#1

Electronics Counter in
Back of Store

Counter in Front
of Store

Total Combined
Locations

10

10

20

#2

3

5

8

#3

2

4

6

15
(44%)

19
(56%)

34

All Stores
Combined

Purchases and Data Analysis Strategy
The total amount of thirty-four (34) combined accumulative purchases was $1,730.48 at
all three store chains, #1, #2, and #3—all made with credit/debit card payments in a five (5)
consecutive days period. Broken down, $787.64 was spent during transactions using a payment
method of plastic credit/debit card at Chain #1; $261.01 at Chain #2; and $681.83 at Chain #3;
finally, $50.55 at Chain #4. The purchases varied in amounts ranging as low as $1.41 to as high
as $246.07, with the average purchase price amounting to $50.89. This figure was obtained by
calculating the total of $1730.48 of all combined purchases divided by 34, the number of total
transactions. Specifically, there were twenty-three (23) purchases made that were under $50.00
each and eleven (11) purchases made that were over $50.00 each.
The purchases were all made over a busy long weekend and shopping holiday of
Valentine’s Day weekend (Sunday, February 14, 2016) and President’s Day (Monday, February
15, 2016) while children were out of school and many parents were given a day off at work.
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Additionally, this period is also when many people are receiving their tax refunds and shopping
capacity is at its peak volume. Also, purchases were made at different times of the day and night
hours to observe any discrepancies in cashiers’ adherence to merchant agreement policies of
credit/debit card payments to either check for authorized signature and government issued photo
identification or not, due to busy hours and long lines, versus least busy hours and no lines.
Specifically, each segment of the twenty-four (24) hour cycle was broken down into four
categories as follows: 12:01 am midnight to 6:00 am as segment 1; 6:01 am to 12:00 noon as
segment 2; 12:01 noon to 6:00 pm as segment 3; and 6:01 pm to 12:00 midnight as segment 4.
There were a total number of two (2) purchases made during segment 1, which was the least
busiest time for shopping; seven (7) purchases made during segment 2, which was a moderately
busy time for shopping; fourteen (14) purchases made during segment 3, which was the busiest
time overall for shopping; and eleven (11) purchases made during segment 4, which was a
moderately busy time for shopping.
Of the thirty-four (34) purchases made, fifteen (15) of them were made at each store’s
electronics counter located in the back near the electronic item purchases; while nineteen (19) of
them were made at a front register either because the item purchased was not an electronic item,
or no one was available at the back electronic counter to assist in the point of sale transaction.
The purpose in choosing electronic counter cashiers versus front register cashiers was to observe
any differences in cashier’s adherence to merchant agreement policies when payments involved a
MasterCard or Visa credit/debit card transaction. Also, being observed were differences in store
practices of security measures in point of sale transactions made at electronic counters for
electronic items commonly targeted by thieves, versus other store items not as commonly
targeted. Specifically, ten (10) electronic purchases were made at the electronics registers in
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back of store Chain #1, three (3) electronic purchases were made at the back electronics registers
at store Chain #2, and two (2) electronic purchases were made at the back electronics registers at
store Chain #3. Ten (10) non-electronic purchases were made at front registers of store Chain
#1; four (4) non-electronic purchases and one (1) electronic purchase was made at the front
registers of store Chain #2; zero non-electronic related purchases were made at store Chain #3 (it
is an all electronics chain store), but six (6) electronic related purchases were made at store
Chain #3, of which two (2) occurred at back registers near the large items purchased –one being
a 32” flat screen television with a built in Roku box and the other being an LG 700W stereo
system—and four smaller items purchased (4) occurring at front registers. Total number of
electronic purchases at all stores combined was twenty (20). Total number of non-electronic
purchases combined at all stores was fourteen (14). One purchase made at the electronics
counter was not electronics items but rather dog food, candy and clothing. Whereas, several (at
least five) electronic purchases were made at front registers versus back electronic counters for
various reasons, primarily lack of cashier assistance available at back electronics department
registers.
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Table 4
Time Segments when Purchases Were Made
Store Chain#
(Coded)

Segment 1

Segment 2

Segment 3

Segment 4

(12:00 am –

(6:01 am-

(12:01 pm –

(6:01 pm –

6:00 pm)

11:59 pm)

6:00 am)

12:00 pm)

#1

2

5

8

5

#2

0

1

3

4

#3

0

1

3

2

All Stores

2

7

14

11

(6%)

(21%)

(41%)

(32%)

Combined
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Table 5
Itemized List of 34 Purchases, Charges Incurred, and Technology Used for Transaction
(Arranged in alphabetical order)
Item
Purchased

Store
Chain
(Coded)

32” Flat screen
TV
Bananas and
Vitamin Drink

3

Bathroom
Tissue

1

Beats
Headphones
Birthday Cards

2

Black Light
Bulb

2

Camera Tripod,
DVD

2

Canon Camera
Bag

3

Canon Photo
Printer +
Glossy
Cat Food,
Bottled Water

3

1

1

1

Chips, Gum

1

Composite AV
Cable

1

Electronic Amount Card Used EMV PIN Magnetic Electronic
or NonCharged
For
Chip
Stripe
Signature
Electronic to Card
Purchase
Required
(Coded)
Electronic $240.73 MasterCard Yes
No
No
Yes
Item
2222
Non$2.76
MasterCard Yes
No
No
No
1111
Electronic
Items
Non$9.85
MasterCard Yes
No
No
No
Electronic
2222
Item
Electronic $116.62 MasterCard Yes
No
No
Yes
Item
2222
Non$6.50
MasterCard Yes
No
No
No
Electronic
1111
Item
Non$5.86
MasterCard Yes
No
No
No
Electronic
1111
Item
No
No
Yes
Electronics $57.05 MasterCard Yes
1111
Related
Item
Electronic
$23.49 MasterCard No
No
No
No
Related
1111
Item
Electronic
$150.01 Visa Debit
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Item
3333
NonElectronic
Items
NonElectronics
Item
Electronics
Related
Item

$10.24

MasterCard
1111

Yes

No

No

No

$4.67

MasterCard
2222

Yes

No

No

No

$10.49

MasterCard
1111

Yes

No

No

No
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Item
Purchased

Store
Chain
(Coded)

DVD

2

DVD/VCR
Combo
DVD’s

1

Energizer
Rechargeable
Battery Pack
Ethernet Inline
Coupler

1

1

3

Fireproof
Security File

2

Flat Screen TV
Wall Mount

1

Generic
Acetaminophen

2

Gloves

1

Gum, Dasani

2

LG 700W
Shelf Stereo
Listerine
Mouthwash

3
1

Magellan GPS

1

Pillow, Dog
Food, Shirt

1

Popcorn

2

Electronic Amount Card Used EMV PIN Magnetic
or NonCharged
for
Chip
Stripe
Electronic to Card
Purchase
(Coded)
Electronics
$5.49
Visa Debit
No
Yes
Yes
Related
3333
Item
Electronic $113.25 MasterCard Yes
No
No
Item
2222
Electronics $13.87
Visa-Debit
No
Yes
Yes
Related
3333
Items
Electronics $20.82 MasterCard Yes
No
No
Related
2222
Item
Electronics $10.94 MasterCard Yes
No
No
Related
2222
Item
Non$69.52 MasterCard Yes
No
No
Electronic
1111
Item
No
No
Electronics $95.13 MasterCard Yes
1111
Related
Item
Non$3.27
MasterCard Yes
No
No
Electronic
1111
Item
Non$4.38
MasterCard Yes
No
No
Electronic
1111
Item
Non$3.09
MasterCard Yes
No
No
Electronic
1111
Items
Electronic $246.07 MasterCard Yes
No
No
Item
2222
No
No
Non$6.54
MasterCard Yes
Electronic
1111
Item
Electronic $106.46 MasterCard Yes
No
No
Item
2222
Non$26.58 MasterCard Yes
No
No
Electronic
1111
Items
Non$1.41
MasterCard Yes
No
No
Electronic
1111
Item
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Signature
Required

No

Yes
No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes
No

Yes
No

No

Item
Purchased

Store
Electronic Amount Card Used EMV PIN Magnetic
Chain
or NonCharged
for
Chip
Stripe
(Coded) Electronic to Card
Purchase
(Coded)
Princess Barbie
1
Non$9.88
MasterCard Yes
No
No
Electronic
1111
Item
Samsung
1
Electronic $206.14 MasterCard Yes
No
No
Android Cell
Item
1111
Phone
SanDisk 16GB
3
Electronics $10.91 MasterCard No
No
No
Memory Card
Related
1111
Item
Straight Talk
1
Electronics $50.55
Visa
Yes
No
No
Phone Card
Related
4444
Item
No
No
Swimwear
1
Non$23.93 MasterCard Yes
1111
Electronic
Item
Valentine
1
Non$37.51 MasterCard Yes
No
No
Cards, Candy,
Electronic
1111
Flowers
Items
Xbox 360
1
Electronics $28.09 MasterCard Yes
No
No
Video Game
Related
2222
Item
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Signature
Required

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

Table 6
Electronics Related Purchases vs. Non-Electronics Related Purchases
(34 Combined Purchases in Total)
Number of
Purchases
Made at Store
Chain
#1

Electronics
Related Items

NonElectronics
Related Items

Total Combined

10

10

20

#2

4

4

8

#3

6

0

6

20
(59%)

14
(41%)

34

All Stores
Combined

Credit Card Data Analysis and Coding
The total number of sales transactions involving plastic credit/debit card payments were
thirty-four (34) combined accumulative at all store chains and from all transactions. Four
different credit/debit cards were utilized where purchaser and observer both were the legal
cardholder. Of these four, two (2) of the credit/debit cards were MasterCard accounts (both with
new chip technology and magnetic strip slide capability) and two (2) were Visa accounts (slide
only cards still without chip technology). For privacy purposes and maintenance of PID of the
legal cardholder, these four credit cards will be coded as follows: The first credit/debit
MasterCard account primarily used for twenty (20) purchases, encrypted with chip technology
and magnetic slide strip will be coded as ending in 1111; the second credit/debit MasterCard
account secondarily used for ten (10) purchases, also encrypted with chip technology and
magnetic slide strip will be coded as ending in 2222; the third debit Visa account thirdly used for
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only three (3) purchases, and not yet encrypted with chip technology but only has magnetic slide
strip that requires a pin number to complete transactions will be coded as ending in 3333; and
finally, the fourth credit Visa account lastly used for only one (1) purchase, and not yet encrypted
with chip technology but only has magnetic slide strip that does not require a pin number will be
coded as ending in 4444. None of the previously described and coded cards have been officially
signed by the researcher and legal cardholder, nor any other person; therefore, the backs of each
card are blank in the white strips provided for “Authorized Signature” and stated as “Not Valid
Unless Signed” by the card issuer.
There were a total number of thirty-one point of sales transactions made with three credit
cards coded above as ending in 1111, 2222, and 4444 that did not require a pin number for
transactions to be completed by cashiers. The total amount of charges applied to MasterCard for
combined twenty purchases was $613.06 on card coded as ending in 1111. The total amount of
charges applied to MasterCard account for combined ten (10) purchases was $897.50 on card
coded as ending in 2222. And the total amount of charges applied to Visa credit card account
coded as ending in 4444 was $50.55. Two of these cards were equipped with chip technology
(1111 and 2222), and one was slide only (4444). There were a total of three point of sale
transactions totaling $169.37 combined that required a pin number and they were all involving
the Visa debit card coded as ending in 3333, of which, the legal cardholder and researcher knew
the correct pin number associated with this account. One transaction occurred at store Chain #1,
one occurred at store Chain #2, and one occurred at store Chain #3—each being debit
transactions. Zero (0) of the remaining thirty-one purchases made with credit cards equipped
with chip technology or not (1111, 2222, and 4444), ultimately required a pin number to
complete these in store point of sale transactions. (Add total combined purchase amount)
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Two of those specific transactions, both made at store Chain #3 (where only electronic
related items are sold) and both using MasterCard account coded as ending in 1111 and
encrypted with chip technology, but also containing a magnetic slide strip were prompted by the
electronic signature pad system to provide a pin number. However, when the researcher and
legal cardholder told the cashiers at each store (one transaction involving a white female cashier,
and one transaction involving a black male cashier) that she could not remember the pin number
the system was prompting her for, each one offered to assist her by putting the account number
in manually from another screen. Once the account number was properly entered manually, then
the cashier was prompted to enter the three digit security code on the back of the card. Each
cashier during each one of the two individual transactions at two different store locations within
the region, held the card in their hand viewing the back of the card to see and enter the security
code located at the end of the white strip on the back that is designated for the authorized
signature. Both of these two cashiers had opportunity to see that the card was not properly
signed and the white area was blank. They each also had opportunity to read the statement near
the blank strip that read “Not Valid Unless Signed.” Neither of the cashiers said anything to the
legal cardholder and purchaser during the transaction about the need to sign her card nor their
need of verifying who she was by asking to see her photo identification according to
MasterCard’s merchant agreement, since the card was not signed and authorized for use. Each
one of these two cashiers at two different store locations of Chain #3 successfully completed the
transactions for her manually without the need or use of a pin number as the electronic signature
pad and system was requesting. Both of these transactions were made at front registers of this
store chain. The amount of one purchase was $10.91 and the item was a SanDisk 16 GB
Memory Card. The amount of the other purchase was $$63.17 and the item was a Canon Gadget
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Camera Bag. This purchase involved $40.00 cash and $23.17 on MasterCard coded as ending in
1111. It is worth mentioning that these two individual purchases were made at busy shopping
times of the day, with one purchase made at peak busy hours at 4:06 pm and the other at
moderately busy shopping hours of 11:18 am.
Table 7
Total Charges Incurred at Each Store Chain from All 34 Transactions
Store Chain #
(Coded)

#1

Charges

Charges

Charges

Charges

Applied to

Applied to

Applied to

Applied to

Card “1111”

Card “2222”

Card “3333”

Card “4444”

$440.08

$283.14

$13.87

$50.55

Totals

$787.64
(46%)

#2

$138.90

$116.62

$5.49

$0

$261.01
(15%)

#3

$34.08

$497.74

$150.01

$0

$681.83
(39%)

All Stores
Combined

$613.06

$897.50

$169.37

$50.55

$1730.48

(35 %)

(52%)

(10%)

(3%)

(Combined
%’s =
100%)
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Table 8
Number of Sales Transactions Attributed to Each Card
Card “1111”

Card “2222”

Card “3333”

Card “4444”

20 (59%)

10 (29%)

3 (9%)

1 (3%)

Summary of Transactions
A summary of the thirty-four (34) individual transactions is as follows: twenty-eight
different stores were selected accessed randomly by convenience along I-81, I-40, I-75, and I-26
within Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia for a combined accumulative of thirtyfour (34) separate transactions involving thirty-four (34) separate individual cashiers who were
also selected randomly based upon who was available at the register to assist my transaction at
the time the transaction occurred, but were somewhat balanced between eighteen (18) female
cashiers and sixteen (16) male cashiers. The times of these transactions took place and were
coded within four segmented hours of the twenty-four hour cycle: 12:01 am-6:00 am; 6:01 am –
12:00 noon; 12:01 noon – 6pm; and 6:01 pm – 12:00 midnight in order to establish the busiest to
least busiest shopping hours and how this could have an effect upon the cashiers’ attention to
maintain merchant agreement or store policy pertaining to plastic card transactions. Thirty-one
of these thirty-four (34) in store point of sale transactions did not require a pin number to
complete the transaction. Three of these transactions did require a pin number, and they were all
made using a Visa debit card coded as ending in 3333. Twenty-three of these transactions were
made without the need for an electronic signature. All of these twenty-three (23) transactions
were under $50.00 each. Each of the eleven (11) transactions that were made with a purchase
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amount over $50.00 each did in fact require an electronic signature and it was stated on the
receipts of store Chain #1 as ‘signature verified.’ The total amount of charges applied to a
combination of four (4) credit/debit cards utilized was $1,730.48 over a five (5) day period of
shopping and observations. $787.64 was spent at store Chain #1 (at fifteen separate stores).
$261.01 was spent at store Chain #2 (at eight separate stores). $681.83 was spent at store Chain
#3 (at six separate stores). Two MasterCard accounts were used with chip technology and two
Visa accounts were used, one debit and one credit, without chip technology and magnetic slide
strips and pin numbers. These cards were coded as ending in 1111, and 2222 for the two
MasterCard accounts; and, 3333 and 4444 for the two Visa card accounts. The total amount
charged at all stores and chains for MasterCard ending in 1111 was $613.06. The total amount
charged at all stores and chains for MasterCard ending in 2222 was $897.50. The total amount
charged at all stores and chains for Visa debit ending in 3333 was $169.37. Last, the total
amount charged at all stores and chains for Visa credit ending in 4444 was $50.55. The times of
the day or night were recorded as well as the amount of purchase and the gender and race of the
cashier for comparison purposes. Fifteen electronic purchases were made using electronic
counters and nineteen non-electronic purchases were made using front registers for comparative
purposes of cashier merchants’ agreement management. Receipts were saved for documentation
but are stored securely in a locked security box.
The following Tables 9-12 are test questions analyzing for absence or presence of capable
guardianship, while applying the R.A.T. based upon the accumulative documentations made on
each observations report (See Appendix A):
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Table 9
Test Question 1 Results for Analyzing Capable Guardianship
Test Question 1 for Analyzing Capable Guardianship:
Did the cashier participant at the POS terminal ask to see the researcher’s card in hand being
used for payment during any time for any reason while the face-to-face sales transaction
occurred?
Store Chain # (Coded)
YES
NO
#1

0:20 (0%)

20:20 (100%)

#2

0:8 (0%)

8:8

#3

2:6 (33%)

(100%)

4:6 (67%)

Table 10
Test Question 2 Results for Analyzing Capable Guardianship
Test Question #2 for Analyzing Capable Guardianship:
Did the cashier specifically check the account numbers or the back of the card to see if the card
being used for payment was signed and valid or unsigned and not valid for purchases?
Store Chain # (Coded)
YES
NO
#1

0:20 (0%)

20:20 (100%)

#2

0:8 (0%)

8:8

#3

0:6 (0%)

6:6 (100%)

99

(100%)

Table 11
Test Question 3 Results for Analyzing Capable Guardianship
Test Question #3 for Analyzing Capable Guardianship:
Did the cashier participant ask the researcher to sign her unsigned card, deemed by Visa and
MasterCard alike as “not valid” for purchases, in his or her presence to legitimately authorize it
before the face-to-face sales transaction could be processed and completed at the POS terminal?
Store Chain # (Coded)

YES

NO

#1

0:20 (0%)

20:20 (100%)

#2

0:8 (0%)

8:8 (100%)

#3

0:6 (0%)

6:6 (100%)

Table 12
Test Question 4 Results for Analyzing Capable Guardianship
Test Question #4 for Analyzing Capable Guardianship:
Did the cashier participant at the POS terminal ask to see the researcher’s government issued
photo identification bearing her genuine signature to compare it to the requested signature
provided in the presence of the cashier at any time during the face-to-face card in hand in store
sales transaction?
Store Chain # (Coded)
YES
NO
#1

0:20 (0%)

20:20 (100%)

#2

0:8 (0%)

8:8

#3

0:6 (0%)

6:6 (100%)

100

(100%)

Table 13
Results of Accumulative %’s of All Test Questions Combined for Analyzing Capable
Guardianship
TEST QUESTIONS FOR ANALYZING GUARDIANSHIP
Store Chain #

1

2

3

4

TOTAL
COMBINED

#1

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

#2

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

#3

33%

0%

0%

0%

8%

This table demonstrates that there was an overall absence of capable guardianship by all
three store chains at POS terminals and that their employees are not adhering to Visa and
MasterCard policy guidelines outlined by the merchant contracts for acceptance of card
payments. Store chain #3’s percentage of 33% indicates only that there were two (2) employees
that actually took the researcher’s credit card in hand before completing the transaction, but it
does not explain that those same two employees did so because the researcher could not
remember her PIN number being prompted by the electronic processing system and that these
two participants, at separate stores and states but within the same store chain, too her card and
looked on the back of the card specifically to find the security CVV code to manually input into
the system on their side in order to override the need for inputting a PIN number. Both of these
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participants had opportunity to notice whether the card was signed and authorized but neither
did. So in effect, these two were actually more negligent and there was a greater absence of
capable guardianship demonstrated in these numbers that what appears in the table.
Table 14
Variates 1 & 2 in Demographics’ Effects on Presence of Capable Guardianship
VARIATES of
DEMOGRAPHICS
GENDER

RACE

STORE
CHAIN
(CODED)

MALE

FEMALE

WHITE OR
CAUSASIAN

#1

0%

0%

0%

BLACK OR
AFRICAN
AMERICAN
0%

#2

0%

0%

0%

0%

#3

0%

0%

0%

0%

The 0 %’s represent the percentages of males, and females, both Black and White that
demonstrated increased levels of guardianship during accumulative transactions. As this table
represents, race nor gender increased levels of capable guardianship and there were no
differences observed between male or female participants, nor Black or White participants at
POS terminals in each store chain. This table also indicates and overall absence of capable
guardianship for both genders and races. In conclusion, the variates of race and gender has had
no significant impact on the outcome of this study. Zero percent (0%) of both races and genders

102

checked the back of the unsigned card being processed for an authorized signature, nor did they
require it to be signed nor ask for government issued photo identification.
Table 15
Variates 3, 4, & 5’s Effects on Presence of Capable Guardianship
(Electronic vs. Non-Electronic, Location of POS Terminal inside Store (Front or Back), and
Time Segment of Shopping Hours)
SALES TRANSACTION VARIATES
STORE
CHAIN

ELECTRONIC ITEM
VS. NONELECTRONIC ITEM

BACK POS TERMINAL TIME SEGMENT
VS.
(Busy vs.
FRONT POS
Not Busy)
TERMINAL
Front of
Back of
1
2
3
4
store
store

Electronic

NonElectronic

#1

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

#2

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

#3

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

(CODED)

This table demonstrates that these three variates: 1) Electronic item vs. non-electronic
item, and where the POS terminal was located within the store, 2) Back of store at electronics
counter vs. front of the store at checkout near entrance, and 3) Time segment of the day that the
transaction occurred and whether the store was experiencing busy shopping hours versus not
busy shopping hours, or opening or closing hours, made absolutely no impact on the study or
outcome. There was not a higher level of guardianship demonstrated by the participants even
when the item was an electronics items or the POS terminal was located in the electronics
department. The time segment in which the transaction occurred did not make an impact upon
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increasing the presence of guardianship. Overall, there was a generalized absence of capable
guardianship demonstrated by all three store chains regardless of all three of these variates. Not
one participant checked the back of the credit card to authenticate the researcher’s identity prior
to processing each transaction. Not one participant required the unsigned card to be signed nor
did anyone of the participants request or require government issued photo identification.
Findings on Guardianship Efforts by Participants at POS Terminals
Research Question 1 Findings and Hypothesis Discussed
RQ1: The first research question contains five parts: 1) Will the cashier at the point of
sale transaction act as a capable guardian over the face-to-face transaction and act to help prevent
identity theft and credit/debit card fraud by taking the card into his or her hand to visually check
the back of the credit or debit card to see if it bears an authorized signature by the legal
cardholder, or check the account number on the card and compare it to that in the system or
receipt in according to the merchant agreement rules as mandated by the Bank Rules and
Regulations, Visa and MasterCard? (See Appendices B, C, & D). Variables investigated:
2) Will the variables of non-electronic versus electronic purchase increase levels of capable
guardianship? Will there be a difference in the level of capable guardianship if the purchase is
made at the back electronic counter POS terminal versus the store’s front end POS terminal? 3)
Will the higher amount of purchase charges to the card raise levels of guardianship at POS
terminals with electronic purchases compared to a low levels of guardianship for small charges
to the card? 4) Will the variables of time segment of day or night and business or lack thereof
give increase or decrease to the levels of capable guardianship? 5) Will there be a difference of
levels of guardianship based upon gender or race of the employee processing the transaction at
each POS terminal?
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Findings: Table 10 Test Question #2 for Analyzing Capable Guardianship:
Did the cashier specifically check the account numbers or the back of the card to see if the card
being used for payment was signed and valid or unsigned and not valid for purchases?,
demonstrates that zero percent (0%) of the participants specifically checked the back of the
researcher’s unsigned card for an authorized signature validating the card for use. (See page 101
for Table 10). Additionally, the five variates investigated to determine if each in itself or in
combination with other variates would raise the level of guardianship and persuade or require the
participant employees conducting each transaction at the POS terminals to ask for the
researcher’s card to specifically check for an authorized signature or compare the account
information of numbers on the front of the card to that which was showing in the system. None
of these five variates had any impact whatsoever on raising the level of guardianship. The
findings conclude that there is an overall absence of capable guardianship at these three store
chains POS terminals. (See Table 14, page 104, for variates of demographics of race and
gender; see Table 15, page 105, for variates of electronic vs. non-electronic items, time segment
of purchase and busy hours or not, and costs of items. See also Tables 11-13, pages 102-103, for
test questions determine absence or presence of capable guardianship.)
Hypothesis discussed: Ho1 is validated and proven to be correct based upon the findings
that conclude that zero percentage (0%) of the 34 participants at the 28 stores patronized for
shopping within the three separate store chains within the Tri-State region checked the back of
the researcher’s credit or debit card specifically for an authorized signature. Ho1 hypothesized
that there would be none that would check the back of her card to see it was unsigned nor require
her to sign it, indicating that there is an overall absence of capable guardianship at these
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particular retail store chains POS terminals. This validated hypothesis is a critical element to the
purpose of this research and the theory behind it.
Research Question 2 Findings and Hypothesis Discussed
RQ2: Will the cashier at the face-to-face transaction at the POS (point-of-sale) terminal
require the cardholder and purchaser to sign the back of the unsigned card used for purchase, and
will he or she make her show a government issued photo identification for verification of her
identity before the transaction is allowed to be processed through, in keeping with merchant
agreement rules as mandated by Bank Rules and Regulations, Visa and MasterCard?
Findings: As demonstrated in Table 12 Test Question #4 for Analyzing Capable
Guardianship, the question was investigated: Did the cashier participant at the POS terminal
ask to see the researcher’s government issued photo identification bearing her genuine signature
to compare it to the requested signature provided in the presence of the cashier at any time
during the face-to-face card in hand in store sales transaction? The results of all 34 individual
transactions conducted by 34 individual participants and accumulated from 28 stores within three
national store chains yielded the same zero percent (0%) collectively. (See page 102 for Table
12).
Hypothesis discussed: Ho2 was proven to be correct by this study. Not one employee
participant asked to see the researcher’s government issued photo identification as mandated by
Visa and MasterCard card acceptance guidelines when the credit or debit card is unsigned and
not authorized or valid for use. It should be noted that Visa nor MasterCard does not require
photo identification for processing signed and authorized cards, but both do so for unsigned
cards (See Appendices A, B, & C).
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Research Question 3 Findings and Hypothesis Discussed
RQ3: Will the cashier act in lieu of an FDE (Forensic Document Examiner) to
investigate by visual comparison the general similarities or differences of handwriting
demonstrated on the government issued photo identification bearing a genuine signature of the
researcher to that of the unsigned card that should be required to be signed in the presence of the
cashier at the POS terminal?
Findings: As demonstrated in Table 9 Test Question 1 for Analyzing Capable
Guardianship: Did the cashier participant at the POS terminal ask to see the researcher’s card
in hand being used for payment during any time for any reason while the face-to-face sales
transaction occurred?, there were 0% of participants who took the card in hand specifically to
check for an authorized signature on the back of the card’s signature strip. Subsequently, there
were no participants that requested to see government issued photo ID (see Table 12) and have a
genuine signature to visualize and used for comparison. None of the participants personally
looked at the researcher’s signature on either. So zero percent (0%) of the participants attempted
to act in lieu of a Forensic Document Examiner (FDE) to determine if the generalized
appearance of the signatures being compared were genuine or spurious.
Hypothesis discussed: Therefore, since zero percent (0%) of the participants attempted to
act in lieu of a Forensic Document Examiner (FDE) to determine if the generalized appearance
of the signatures being compared were genuine or spurious. Ho3 is validated and found to be
correct in this study by these participants only. It is important to note that there are other retail
stores that do train there their employee participants to attempt to visualize and compare
signatures for general similarities or differences but not on the forensic as an FDE.
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Research Question 4 Findings and Hypothesis Discussed
RQ4: Will the cashier rely solely upon the electronic capturing device to verify the
signature and not personally look at it himself or herself?
Findings: Once again, as demonstrated in Table 9 Test Question 1 for Analyzing Capable
Guardianship: Did the cashier participant at the POS terminal ask to see the researcher’s card
in hand being used for payment during any time for any reason while the face-to-face sales
transaction occurred?, there were 0% of participants who took the card in hand specifically to
check for an authorized signature on the back of the card’s signature strip. Subsequently, there
were no participants that requested to see government issued photo ID (see Table 12) and have a
genuine signature to visualize and used for comparison. None of the participants personally
looked at the researcher’s signature on either.
Hypothesis discussed: Therefore, Ho4, which hypothesized that the participants would
demonstrate accumulative results showing their overall reliance upon technology to process and
check for genuine signatures is validated and found to be correct. Table 5 Itemized List of 34
Purchases, Charges Incurred, and Technology Used for Transaction, provides an itemized list of
the technology that was relied upon for each transaction to be completed. (See pages 92-94)
Research Question 5 Findings and Hypothesis Discussed
RQ5: Will the participant cashier at the POS terminal solely depend upon the EMV chip
reader technology newly implemented at the POS terminals equipped with such to “guard” over
the identity of the cardholder, even when neither a PIN number nor signature is required nor
requested for the transaction to be processed?
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Findings: There were comments made by several participants at two separate store
chains, #1 and #3, that were included into the additional notes section on the observation reports
that the new EMV chip technology made the transaction so safe that they did not need a PIN
number for card transactions anymore, when the researcher was asking if she needed to input a
PIN number to process the transaction because she did not have one with the particular card
being utilized for each of those transactions.
Hypothesis discussed: This observational finding indicates that there is a false
expectation by the employee participants of the new EMV chip technology to completely
eradicate identity theft related to card fraud, and that it will in essence “guard” over the
cardholder’s account even without a PIN number. It is reasonable to assume this hypothesis to
be somewhat validated based upon those few additional comments made by several participants
during those transactions. However, this particular research question and hypothesis would be
better investigated and validated by future research involving interviews or surveys completed by
employee participants and managers.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSIONS
In reviewing the purpose of this research study, the problem of identity theft and plastic
card fraud has been increasingly become a national and international problem. The significance
of this crime has contributed to rise in white collar criminal activity and has subsequently
warranted the increase in technological advances to curtail it, such as electronic signature pads to
capture and store digitized signatures, and also the need to implement encrypted chips into
American credit/debit cards for security purposes. The areas being investigated by this
observational study include two major questions: 1) Are cashiers at point of sale transactions
inside the three major department stores that are commonly targeted for fraudulent purchases by
plastic card means acting as capable guardians (applying the R.A.T. criminology theory) by
checking the backs of credit cards to see if they are authorized with a genuine signature? And 2)
If the card is not signed and authorized to make it valid for purchases, are the cashiers asking for
or requiring government issued photo identification with a genuine handwritten signature for
identification verification purposes and comparison? To investigate these questions, thirty-four
individual transactions were made with thirty-four individual cashiers at twenty-eight separate
store locations within the three major department store chains, which were coded for privacy.
These stores were located within East Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia. Four
separate credit/debit cards were used to make these thirty-four purchases, two of which were
MasterCard accounts using chip technology, and two of which were Visa accounts using
magnetic slide strips only. The results of this observational study were significant in realizing
the absence of capable guardianship at in store point of sale contacts between employees and
purchasers. Regardless of time of day transaction took place, or whether or not the store was
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busy with other customers waiting in line, or whether the cashier was a female or a male, black
or white, no one checked the back of the credit card for an authorized signature. Nor did they
follow up according to merchant agreement guidelines and rules of MasterCard and Visa to
require a government issued photo identification with a genuine signature for comparison, nor
require the purchaser, who was also the primary investigator to sign the back of the card in the
white blank strip designated for “AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE” near the statement “NOT
VALID UNLESS SIGNED” This negligence is suspected to be in part or whole of improper
training or incentives, or unreasonable reliance upon technology—whether it be the electronic
signature pads capturing and storing the digitized marks made by purchasers or the new chips
that have been encrypted into new credit cards, with or without the use of pin numbers or
electronic signatures. This research implies that genuine handwritten signatures are obsolete in
store purchases of these specific three large department store chains, without the use of
electronic signature pads. The handwritten signature on the backs of the credit or debit cards
authorizing the card and making it valid for use is forgotten in practice.
Summary of Findings
The most important findings that have emerged from this observational study are that it
does not matter whether the store is busy or not busy, what time of the day or night a consumer
shops, or at which of the three major department store chains that were patronized for purchases
of electronic items or non-electronic item; or whether the cashier is male or female, Black or
White, the cashiers are not aggressively acting in roles of capable guardians to prevent or
minimize identity theft and credit/debit card fraud. Nor does it matter if the credit card being
utilized has new chip technology or only a magnetic slide stripe, the point of sale transactions are
not being guarded capably within these particularly common and popular three chains used for
111

many electronic purchases. These specific chains were chosen because they are highly targeted
by thieves who realize their opportunities for identity theft and credit/debit card fraud because of
failure to capably guard point of sale transactions at registers, whether they are electronics
counters or front end registers. For reasons yet undisclosed and undiscovered by this qualitative
study limited to observations only, cashiers are not effectively guarding sales transactions using
plastic payment methods. This could be in part or whole to improper training or incentives to do
so, or it could be in part due to apathy or ignorance of merchant agreement rules of MasterCard
and/or Visa, which requires an authorized signature on the back of each card issued to make the
credit or debit card legally valid for in store use or otherwise. These findings suggest that there
is also a strong reliance upon technology for validation of credit or debit cards, and that the new
chip technology, as well as the electronically verified signature, has replaced the former style of
a legible signature of the legal cardholder and verification of it upon visual inspection and
comparison to any government issued photo identification—at least in the minds of the cashiers
of these particular store chains. The old-fashioned handwritten signature of an in store purchaser
either on the back of their credit card or receipt is all but forgotten it seems. Why is this? The
answer to this question is yet to be discovered and warrants future investigation including cashier
surveys and manager surveys. The implication is there is an unwarrantedly strong, yet blind
reliance upon technology—whether it be a chip in a credit card without a pin for protection, or
whether it be an electronic signature that is inconsistently digitized by incongruent strokes or
marks when signed in different electronically engineered e-pad systems or even using different
signs and symbols to sign it. The conception and perhaps ultimately misconception is that newer
methods are better and safer, and that former simpler methods, like that of simply checking the
back of a credit or debit card for an authorized signature is no longer necessary. Thus, making it
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unnecessary to require any government issued photo identification that would bear the likeness
of image of purchaser or the likeness of their genuine handwritten signature. Societal advances
beyond common logical reasoning are not truly advances at all, are they? If these technological
advances were being used in conjunction with basic preventative measures, such as checking the
back of a credit card and requiring a signature and photo identification if not authorized, then
they would yield the ultimate capable guardianship potentials. In conclusion, technological
guardianship cannot currently be effective without capable human guardianship.
Conclusions
Are the cashiers acting as capable guardians during in store point of sale transactions, in
keeping with store policies and merchant agreement contracts between the card issuers of
MasterCard and Visa and the legal cardholders of the accounts, in efforts to help prevent and
minimize identity theft and credit/debit card fraud? Based upon this qualitative observational
research, and these specific findings associated with these thirty-four individual transactions and
coherently thirty-four individual cashiers at twenty-eight separate stores within three store chains
in a four state region, the answer is ‘NO’, and one that warrants further investigation. The
specific objective of this observational study was to see if each cashier would check the back of
the credit/debit card for an authorized signature and require government issued photo
identification in the absence of an authorized signature. The conditions involved whether the
cashiers were male or female, and how busy or not the store was at the time of purchase. These
factors could have an impact on how the transaction was capably guarded or not. For instance, if
the store were busy and the lines were long, then the cashier, male or female would be less apt to
act as a capable guardian due to job performance pressure and time constraints to keep customers
from becoming impatient and irritable. How a male guards the point of sale transaction may
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differ from how a female would manage her role as guardian. However, the findings were nonspecific to either time of day, busy hours or least busy hours; or whether the cashier acting in
role of guardian were male, female, black or white.
Limitations of Thesis Research
This field research was limited strictly to observations made as a credit card payment
purchaser in 28 separate large department stores of three commonly targeted chains—all located
within the Tri-State region of Eastern Tennessee, Western Virginia, and Northeastern North
Carolina and one in Georgia. Therefore, it lacks sufficient quantity for external validity and
large generalizability. Additionally, it does not involve guardianship issues related to online
identity theft and credit or debit card fraud that is also a major contributor of fraud. The internal
validity is weakened in that this study only portrays the observations of those representatives
sampled within this specific region. Therefore, the information gathered and coded for this
analysis is restricted to observations only and not interviews with individual managers or
employees, which may yield additional insight to findings. There is little criminological research
done on this specific area of adequate guardianship at point of sale transactions involving in store
merchant sales clerk employees or managers and their adherence to the merchant agreement
contracts as mandated by Visa, MasterCard and Bank Rules (See Appendix B, C, & D). To date,
no criminology research has been reported analyzing why large scale identity theft in credit and
debit card fraud occurs at specific large department store chains or why they are strongly
considered as suitable targets by motivated fraud offenders.
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Recommendations
Recommendations based upon this observational study include training of managers and
employees as to the necessity of basic preventative measures of checking for signatures and
asking for photo identification when there is none, in common sense efforts to prevent identity
theft and plastic card fraud. There is also an indication that sole reliance upon technology
without these basic preventative measures leads to opportunities for identity theft and
credit/debit card fraud to continue on aggressively as criminal minds search for system
loopholes. In comparing what has been discovered in data collection, data analysis, and
discussion, this study reveals the need for educating cashiers to be better equipped at capable
guardianship at point of sale contacts with purchasers and potential identity thieves using credit/
debit card fraud. This study reveals that cashiers are not acting as capable guardians in keeping
with merchant agreement obligations with MasterCard and Visa and simply checking the backs
of credit or debit cards to see if there is an authorized signature, nor asking for government
issued photo identification if there is not. Inadvertently, this study shows that handwritten
signatures are a thing of the past at point of sale transactions and are primarily used only on
electronic pads to make a mark—any mark. If these store chains and others were to couple the
use of technology with aggressive preventative practices of checking for handwritten signatures
and requiring photo identification for visual comparisons of the person and the person’s
handwritten signatures, and do so consistently across all store chains and businesses, then in
store fraudulent purchases would be expected to diminish. Training cashiers to become adequate
in capable human guardianship would provide most promising results in diminishing in store
fraud occurring repeatedly at targeted store chains. The Routine Activities Theory is the most
plausible to be applied to these daily transactions within businesses and should be carefully
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analyzed and utilized by security within each department store chain to develop the best overall
plan for prevention of fraud.
Future Research
This study raises awareness and demonstrates the need for future research regarding the
consumer habits of signing electronic signature pads and with what marks to determine the true
value and usefulness of this technology in preventing or identifying identity theft and nongenuine signatures of purchasers. Future research is also indicated in determining the usefulness
of chip technology without the use of pin numbers, and only chip and electronic signatures.
While there is capacity to store electronic signatures and recall them on a need to know basis, the
validity of the same may never come into question if there is no need to know and does not serve
as a deterrent nor preventative of crime. It is only somewhat useful if the legal cardholder and
purchaser signs consistently with the same marks, or fluidity of digitized signature. A cross
study of international practices of other countries using both chip and pin technology, and other
technology such as retina identification, etc. coupled with visual inspection of authorized
signatures and photo identification with genuine signatures is imperative to gain a full
comprehensive perspective on the practices that are most beneficial in curbing identity theft and
credit/debit card fraud, in our American society, and international community.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A:
OBSERVATIONS REPORT
Store Chain: ___________________________________________________ (Coded 1, 2 or 3)
Store Location: ______________________________________________ (TN, NC, VA, or GA)
Time Category: ________________________________________________ (Coded 1, 2, 3 or 4)
Exact Time of Transaction and Observations: ______________________________ (Not coded)
Gender of Cashier at POS Terminal: _________________________________ (Male or Female)
Race of Cashier at POS Terminal: ____________________________________ (White or Black)
Counter: _________________________________ (Back of Store Electronics or Front of Store)
Classification of Item: __________________________________ (Electronic or Non-Electronic)
Item Purchased: _______________________________________________________________
Cost of Purchase: ______________________________________________________________
Amount Charged to Card: _______________________________________________________
Type of Card Used for Payment: __________________________________ (MasterCard/VISA)
Security Features of Card Used: ___________________________________________________
(EMV + Magnetic Strip vs. Magnetic Strip Only)
Specific Card Used for Payment: __________________________________________________
(1:4 Choices, Coded as ending in: 1111, 2222, 3333, 4444)
Did cashier check back of card for authorized signature? ________________________ (Yes/No)
Did cashier note that card was not signed? ___________________________________ (Yes/No)
Did cashier ask for it to be signed in the cashier’s presence? _____________________ (Yes/No)
Did the cashier ask to see government issued photo identification? _________________(Yes/No)
Did the purchase require an electronic signature? ______________________________(Yes/No)
Did the purchase require a pin number? _____________________________________ (Yes/No)
Additional:____________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

123

Appendix B:
Bank Card Rules and Regulations
BANK CARD MERCHANT RULES AND REGULATIONS January 2004

-1 Since you (hereinafter "Merchant") have either entered into a Bank Card Merchant Agreement and/or related agreements (collectively referred to herein as
"Bank Card Merchant Agreement") with Fifth Third Bank (collectively referred to herein as "FTB") or receive Visa and/or MasterCard acquiring and/or
related services from FTB, Merchant agrees to comply with and be bound by these Bank Card Merchant Rules and Regulations ("Bank Rules"). These
Bank Rules may be altered or amended from time to time at FTB’s sole discretion and without notice. Merchant also agrees to comply with and be bound
by the Visa U.S.A Inc. By-Laws and Operating Regulations, the Visa International Operating Regulations and any other rules, policies or requirements of
Visa or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates (collectively "Visa Rules") and the MasterCard International Inc. By-Laws and Operating Regulations and any
other rules, policies or requirements of MasterCard or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates (collectively "MasterCard Rules"), any of which may be altered or
amended from time to time and without notice, which are referenced herein and hereby incorporated into these Bank Rules as if fully rewritten herein.
Except for those terms specifically defined herein, all capitalized terms used herein shall have the same meanings as ascribed to them in the Bank Card
Merchant Agreement. Merchant may now, or in the future, participate in one or more other card programs which are supported by FTB in accordance with
its standards ("Other Programs"), including but not limited to Voyager and Wright Express, and may receive services related to these Other Programs from
FTB. In the event that Merchant participates in any such Other Programs, Merchant agrees to comply with and be bound by the Other Programs Bank
Rules published by FTB from time to time, as well as any operating rules or regulations or any other rules, policies or requirements of the applicable Other
Program(s) (“Other Program Rules”). Before Merchant participates in any Other Program, Merchant agrees that it shall request from FTB in writing a copy
of the Other Programs Bank Rules. The Bank Card Merchant Agreement, Visa Rules, MasterCard Rules, Other Program Rules, Other Program Bank Rules
and these Bank Rules are intended to be and shall be construed as consistent parts of a whole as applied to the applicable product type. In the event of a
direct conflict between the Bank Card Merchant Agreement or the Bank Rules and the Visa Rules or the MasterCard Rules, the Visa Rules and MasterCard
Rules shall control; provided, however, Merchant acknowledges and agrees that all agreements with respect to the obligations and liability of FTB are
specified in the Bank Card Merchant Agreement and the Bank Card Merchant Agreement shall control on such subjects notwithstanding anything in the
Bank Rules, Visa Rules, MasterCard Rules, Other Programs Bank Rules, and/or the Other Program Rules.
A. Honoring of Cards
1. The Merchant shall promptly and without discrimination honor all valid Cards within the appropriate categories of acceptance when properly presented
as payment from Cardholders for the purchase of goods and/or services. The Merchant shall maintain a policy that shall not discriminate among customers
seeking to make purchases through use of a valid Card. An unreadable magnetic stripe, in and of itself, does not deem a Card invalid.
2. The Merchant shall not establish minimum or maximum sales transaction amounts as a condition for honoring a Card.
3. The Merchant shall not impose any surcharge on sales transactions.
4. Any purchase price advertised or otherwise disclosed by the Merchant must be the price available when payment is made with a Card.
5. Any tax required to be collected by the Merchant must be included in the total transaction amount and not collected separately in cash.
6. The Merchant shall validate all cards by ensuring the signature on the back of the Card matches the signature on the transaction receipt.
7. The Merchant shall not accept any Card having two signatures on the signature panel located on the back of the Card.
8. The Merchant shall not impose a requirement on Cardholders to provide any personal information, such as a (i) home or business telephone number, (ii)
home or business address, (iii) driver's license number, (iv) photocopy of a driver's license or (v) photocopy of the Card, as a condition for honoring a Card
unless such information is required (a) for mail order, telephone order, or electronic commerce transactions; (b) the transaction amount exceeds a predetermined dollar limit set by FTB; or (c) the information is required by the Card issuer. Except for the specific circumstances cited above, the Merchant
shall not refuse to complete a sales transaction solely because a Cardholder who has complied with all of the conditions for presentment of a Card at the
point-of-sale refuses to provide such additional personal information.
9. A Merchant must not refuse to complete an electronic commerce transaction solely because the Cardholder does not have a digital certificate or other
secured protocol.
10. The Merchant shall not require a Cardholder, as a condition for honoring a Card, to sign a statement that in any way states or implies that the
Cardholder waives any rights to dispute the transaction with the Card issuer or otherwise.
B. Use of Service Marks
1. The Merchant shall adequately display, in accordance with the Visa and MasterCard Rules, the Visa and MasterCard service marks, as applicable, at
points of interaction and on promotional materials to indicate which Cards will be honored at the Merchant's place of business. At a minimum, the Visa and
MasterCard service marks should be on display near the entrance of the Merchant's place of business and must not be less prominent than other service
marks that the Merchant has on display (e.g., American Express, Discover).
2. The Merchant may use the Visa and MasterCard wordmark on promotional, printed, or broadcast materials only to indicate that Cards are accepted for
payment and shall not indicate, either directly or indirectly, that Visa and MasterCard endorse any goods and/or services.
3. A merchant web site must display the Visa and MasterCard Marks in full color to
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indicate card acceptance. The Visa and MasterCard wordmark should be used to indicate acceptance of cards when a visual representation of the marks is
not possible at the merchant web site.
4. The Merchant may not refer to Visa and MasterCard in stating eligibility for its products, services or membership.
C. Authorization
1. The Merchant shall obtain authorization for each sales transaction for the total amount of such transaction. For sales transactions not processed through
an electronic terminal, the Merchant shall type or print legibly on the sales draft the authorization approval code evidencing the authorization so obtained.
2. A Merchant must only deposit transaction receipts that directly result from Cardholder transactions with that Merchant. A Merchant must not deposit a
transaction receipt that it knows or should have known to be either fraudulent or not authorized by the Cardholder
3. A Merchant is responsible for its employees’ actions while in its employ.
4. The Merchant's designated authorization center, or at FTB's option the authorization center designated by FTB (hereafter referred to as "Designated
Authorization Center"), provides such Merchant approval or denial for sales transactions for specific dollar amounts. The Designated Authorization Center
may also provide the Merchant with assistance in the following circumstances.
a. When a sales transaction involves use of a Card and the total amount of the transaction is in excess of the then current and applicable floor limit, if any,
in the Bank Card Merchant Agreement or if a zero floor limit is applicable to such transaction or if there is no mention of a floor limit in the Bank Card
Merchant Agreement.
b. When a sales transaction is completed in partial payment of a single purchase, authorization is required for the amount segment(s) of the purchase
effected with the Card, regardless of the Merchant's floor limit.
c. When a sales transaction is a mail order or telephone order transaction.
d. When a sales transaction, other than mail order or telephone order, involves (i) a handwritten sales draft which does not contain the imprint of the
Merchant plate or the Card, (ii) a Cardholder who is present but without the Card, (iii) a sales draft which is not signed by a Cardholder, (iv) an unsigned
Card, (v) suspicious or unusual circumstances or (vi) an expired Card. When requesting authorization in such circumstances, the Merchant must advise the
Designated Authorization Center of the specific reason(s) authorization is requested.
(1) If the signature panel on the Card is blank, in addition to requesting authorization, the Merchant must do all of the following.
(a) Review positive identification to determine that the user of the Card is the Cardholder. Such identification must consist of a current, official government
identification document (e.g., passport, driver's license) that bears the Cardholder's signature. Such identification, including any serial number, social
security number, or driver's license number and expiration date, must be indicated on the sales draft
(b) Require the Cardholder to sign the signature panel of the Card prior to completing the transaction.
(2) If a sales transaction involves suspicious or unusual circumstances, then the Merchant shall call the Designated Authorization Center and request a
"Code 10" authorization.
5. An authorization code only indicates the availability of a Cardholder's credit as of the time the authorization is obtained. An authorization is no guarantee
that the person presenting the Card is the rightful Cardholder or that the transaction will not be charged back to the Merchant.
6. In the event FTB for whatever reason is unable to obtain, or due to system delays chooses not to wait to obtain, authorization from the Cardholder’s
financial institution, Visa or MasterCard, FTB may at its option “stand-in” for such entities and authorize the sales draft or sales transaction based on
criteria established by FTB, and Merchant remains responsible for such sales draft or sales transaction in accordance with the Bank Card Merchant
Agreement.
7. If a sales transaction is not authorized, the Merchant must not complete the sale. A declined sales transaction is originated from the bank that issued the
Card. The fact that a sales transaction was declined should not be interpreted as a reflection of the Cardholder's credit worthiness. If the Cardholder has any
questions concerning the authorization, instruct such Cardholder to call the bank that issued the Card.
D. Verification and Recovery of Cards
1. If a transaction is not authorized, the Merchant must not complete the sale, and, if instructed by the Designated Authorization Center to pick-up the Card,
the Merchant should do so by reasonable and peaceful means, notify the Designated Authorization Center when the Card has been recovered, and ask for
further instructions.
2. The Merchant shall use reasonable and peaceful means to recover any Card if (i) the account number thereon is listed on any Combined Warning
Bulletin, (ii) the printed four digits above the embossed account number do not match the first four digits of the account number, (iii) the Merchant is
advised to retain it or (iv) the Merchant has reasonable grounds to believe such Card is counterfeit, fraudulent or stolen. The Merchant shall also note the
physical description of the

Retrieved from www.finance.umich.edu/system/files/ccRulesRegs_Jan2004.doc

125

Appendix C:
Visa Rules for Unsigned Cards

Retrieved from https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/merchants/card-acceptance-guidelines-for-merchants.pdf
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Appendix D:
MasterCard Rules Unsigned Card

Retrieved from https://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/Unsigned_Credit_Cards-(Global).pdf
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